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1	The	EU	budget,	an	historical	relic?	
If	there	is	one	subject	that	has	been	thoroughly	explored	for	many	years	it	is	the	EU’s	finances.	
Institutional	 actors,	 like	 the	 Commission	 or	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 or	 many	 academic	
experts	have	all	provided	valuable	and	largely	converging	“diagnoses”	on	the	“weaknesses”	of	
the	EU	budget.		These	could	be	summarised	as	follows:	“As	it	stands	today,	the	EU	budget	is	a	
historical	 relic.	 Expenditures,	 revenues	 and	 procedures	 are	 all	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 present	
and	 future	 state	 of	 EU	 integration.	 Half	 its	 spending	 goes	 on	 supporting	 a	 sector	 whose	
economic	 significance	 is	 declining,	 little	 is	 used	 to	provide	economic	or	non-economic	public	
goods	typically	featuring	large	economies	of	scale,	while	convergence	policy	is	very	dispersed	
across	EU	countries	and	is	not	focused	regarding	the	activities	it	should	support”	1.		
	
1.1	Weak	link	with	the	taxpayer,	financial	deals	and	net	calculations2	
Unlike	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Treaty	 (ECSC)	which	was	 financed	through	 levies	on	the	
production	 of	 coal	 and	 steel	 paid	 directly	 by	 producing	 companies	 (hence	 by	 a	 real	
Community	tax),	the	European	Economic	Community	(EEC)	budget	(like	the	Euratom	budget)	
was	initially	financed	by	a	system	of	contribution	scales	by	Member	State.	However,	the	EEC	
Treaty	 of	 1957	 had	 foreseen	 the	 possibility	 of	 replacing	 national	 contributions	 by	 own	
resources.	 In	 1965,	 the	 Commission	 presented	 a	 global	 package	 of	 measures	 aimed	 at	
establishing	 a	 link	 between	 financing	 the	 common	 agricultural	 policy,	 raising	 independent	
revenue	 for	 the	Community	and	wider	budgetary	powers	 for	 the	European	Parliament.	Not	
only	 did	 the	 Commission	 propose	 a	 gradual	 transfer	 of	 the	 customs	 duties	 and	 agricultural	
levies	 to	 the	 EU	 budget,	 it	 also	 proposed	 to	 allow	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (once	 directly	
elected)	 to	 create	 independent	 sources	 of	 revenue	 for	 the	 Community.	 Thus,	 the	Member	
States’	 veto	 right	would	 have	 disappeared.	 Although	 the	 Commission’s	 proposals	were	 not	
accepted	in	the	end,	concrete	expectations	were	still	raised	by	the	own	resources	decision	of	
1970	 3.	 This	 decision	 established	 not	 only	 the	 principle	 that	 “the	 Communities	 shall	 be	
allocated	 resources	 of	 their	 own”,	 but	 also	 that	 “from	 1	 January	 1975	 the	 budget	 of	 the	
Communities	shall,	 irrespective	of	other	revenue,	be	financed	entirely	from	the	Communities'	
own	resources”	.		
	
The	expression	“own	resources”	suggests	more	than	it	actually	means,	because	the	EU	lacks	a	
genuine	financial	autonomy.	The	practice	has	evolved	in	such	a	way	that	the	adjective	“own”	
before	 resources	 has	 become	 somewhat	 misleading,	 as	 it	 merely	 indicates	 the	 Member	
States’	obligation	to	finance	the	budget,	not	the	autonomy	of	the	EU	to	fix	and	to	manage	its	
financial	resources.		
	
Own	resources	are	not	to	be	equated	with	EU	financial	autonomy4.	Indeed,	there	is	an	indirect	
link	with	 the	 taxpayer	 for	 the	 so-called	 “traditional	 own	 resources”	 (agricultural	 levies	 and	
                                                
1 See Sapir et al. (2003), p. 172.  
2  This section briefly summarizes the analysis made in Cipriani-Marè (2007) and Cipriani (2010). 
3 Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions 
from Member States by the Communities' own resources.  
4 The following definition of “own resources” is given by a working document of the European Parliament on the 
European Communities own resources: “Own resources can be taken to mean a source of finance separate and 
independent of the Member States, some kind of tax revenue assigned once and for all to the Community to fund its 
budget and due to it by right without the need for any subsequent decision by the national authorities. The Member 
States, then, would be required to make payments available to the Community for its budget” (see the annexes to 
the explanatory statement of the Lamassoure Report of 13.3.2007 (A6-0066/2007), working document No 1, p. 
20).  
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customs	duties).	Such	a	link	does	not	exist	at	all	for	the	Gross	National	 Income5	(GNI)-based	
resource.	The	same	applies	to	the	VAT	resource.	Though	potentially	fulfilling	the	characteristic	
of	 “revenue	 accruing	 from	 other	 charges	 introduced	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 common	
policy”6,	 the	 VAT	 resource	 has	 been	 simply	 transformed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 produce	 a	
financial	 contribution,	 which	 is	 directly	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 initial	 objective7.	Moreover,	 since	
1988	the	VAT	assessment	basis	is	capped	at	50%	(initially	55%)	of	the	GNI.	As	a	consequence,	
the	 VAT-based	 own	 resource	 was	 turned	 into	 a	 GNI-based	 resource	 for	 the	 numerous	
countries	concerned	by	the	capping	rule	(11	Member	States	in	2007).	Thus,	around	76	%	of	EU	
revenue	is	directly	or	indirectly	based	on	GNI,	therefore	on	national	contributions.	As	shown	
in	table	1,	the	weight	of	VAT	as	a	source	of	revenue	for	the	EU	budget	has	dramatically	fallen,	
moving	 from	around	60%	 in	the	1988	to	the	 less	 than	10	%	after	2010.	 In	 the	same	period,	
also	 the	other	 traditional	own	 resources	have	 lost	of	 importance,	 reaching	 in	 the	 last	 years	
slightly	more	than	10	%.	The	GNP/GNI-based	resource	has	instead	dramatically	risen	and	it	is	
now	around	75%	of	 the	 total	 revenue	–	se	also	 figure	1.	 In	 table	2	a	breakdown	by	 type	of	
revenue	 is	shown	from	the	 last	 financial	perspective	2014-2020.	There	 is	a	small	 increase	 in	
the	 role	of	VAT	and	custom	duties	within	 the	budget	and	a	 corresponding	 reduction	of	 the	
percentage	provided	by	the	GNI-based	resources.						
		
As	the	Commission	points	out,	“The	present	financing	system	has	ensured	a	smooth	financing	
of	 the	 EU	 budget.	 However,	 in	 its	 present	 form	 the	 financing	 system	 lacks	 a	 direct	 link	 to	
citizens	(…).	The	budgetary	consequences	of	the	Union’s	policies	thus	remain	impalpable	to	the	
general	 public.	With	 the	 overwhelming	weight	 of	 the	 GNI	 resource,	Member	 States,	 and	 in	
particular	net	contributors,	tend	to	judge	EU	policies	and	initiatives	exclusively	in	terms	of	their	
national	allocation	and	with	little	regard	to	the	substance	of	policies,	with	the	risk	of	obscuring	
the	added	value	of	EU	policies”		8.	
		
The	 history	 of	 EU	 finances	 is	 full	 of	 examples	 where	 specific	 arrangements	 have	 been	
introduced	to	accommodate	the	claims	of	one	Member	State	or	 the	other,	 the	“UK	rebate”	
being	just	the	best	known.	Each	new	“Financial	Perspective”	deal	provides	the	opportunity	to	
include	specific	“adjustments”	to	both	revenue	and	expenditure.	The	consequence	is	a	system	
that	suffers	from	instability	and	is	not	applicable	to	all	Member	States	in	the	same	way.		
	
                                                
5  GNI is equal to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) minus primary income payable by resident units to non-resident 
units, plus primary income receivable by resident units from the rest of the world. The GNI and GDP aggregates 
form part of the definitions laid down in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA 95) adopted 
by Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96. The GNI version used for own resources purposes excludes the 
subdivision of Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured (FISIMs). This is so even though it is 
broadly recognised that more accurate GDP levels could be obtained as GDP would include the entire value added 
generated by financial intermediaries. It has been estimated that the impact of allocating FISIM to GDP (and GNI) 
would correspond to an increase of 1.3% (weighed average of the countries), a value close to the overall EU 
budget. It should be stressed, however, that this increase is different from Member State to Member State. 
Including FISIMs in the GDP would inevitably represent a potential change in the allocation key of the GNI 
resource. 
6 This was the criterion set by the Decision of 21 April 1970 (Article 2) to identify resources other than 
agricultural levies, sugar levies and customs duties.   
7 The determination of the assessment base for the VAT resource is calculated by dividing net VAT receipts by the 
“weighted average rate” of VAT. This “intermediate” base had to be subsequently adjusted, with negative or 
positive compensations, in order to obtain a harmonised VAT base corresponding to the provisions in the Sixth 
Directive of 17.5.1977. The “weighted average rate” depends on statistical calculations to take account of the 
different VAT rates applicable to the various categories of taxable goods and services. Hence, this calculation 
reconstructs a fictitious tax distinct from that actually paid by consumers in the various Member States.  
8 European Commission - Financing the European Union, COM (2004) 505 final of 14.7.2004, Volume I, p. 8. 
 5 
Here	are	some	examples	of	corrections	and	derogations	on	the	revenue	side.	
• As	of	2001,	 the	percentage	of	 collection	costs	 refunded	 to	Member	States	 in	 return	 for	
collecting	the	so-called	traditional	own	resources	(customs	duties)	was	increased	from	10%	to	
25%.	Although	of	general	application,	this	measure	was	intended	to	lighten	the	contributions	
to	the	EU	budget	of	some	Member	States	9.	
• In	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 2007-2013	 financial	 perspective	 agreement,	 the	 European	
Council	 concluded	 that	 four	 countries	 should	 benefit	 from	 reduced	 rates	 of	 call	 of	 the	VAT	
resource	to	reduce	their	respective	budgetary	burden.	Thus,	during	the	2007-2013	period	the	
rate	of	call	of	the	VAT	resource	for	Austria	was	fixed	at	0.225	%,	for	Germany	at	0.15	%	and	for	
the	Netherlands	and	Sweden	at	0.10	%.	
• Again	 to	 reduce	 the	 budgetary	 burden	 for	 these	 countries,	 the	 European	 Council	 also	
concluded	 that	 for	 the	period	2007-2013	 the	Netherlands	 shall	 benefit	 from	a	gross	annual	
reduction	in	its	GNI	contribution	of	€	605	million	and	Sweden	from	a	gross	annual	reduction	in	
its	GNI	contribution	of	€	150	million.	
• Because	 of	 the	 enlargement,	 the	 “UK	 rebate”	was	 expected	 to	 rise	 considerably10.	 The	
United	 Kingdom	 finally	 agreed	 to	 reduce	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 rebate	 by	 €	 10.5	 billion	 for	 the	
period	2007-2013	11.	This	will	mean	however	that	the	United	Kingdom	will	not	participate	in	
the	financing	of	the	costs	of	enlargement	related	to	agriculture	and	will	only	fully	participate	
in	other	enlargement-related	expenditure	after	a	phasing-in	period	between	2009	and	2011.	
• In	 principle,	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 “UK	 rebate”	 is	 to	 be	 borne	 by	 the	 other	 Member	 States	
through	a	corresponding	increase	in	their	contributions	to	the	EU	budget.	However,	since	the	
entry	into	force	of	the	rebate,	in	1986,	Germany	has	been	allowed	to	pay	only	two	thirds	of	its	
normal	share,	the	balance	being	divided	between	the	other	Member	States	on	the	same	scale.	
As	of	1.1.2002,	the	European	Council	again	altered	the	scale	for	financing	the	“UK	rebate”,	by	
reducing	 the	 share	 paid	 by	Germany,	 the	Netherlands,	 Austria	 and	 Sweden	 to	 a	 quarter	 of	
what	 it	 ought	 to	 be.	 Consequently,	 these	 reductions	 are	 again	 made	 up	 by	 all	 the	 other	
Member	States	12.	
	
As	a	result,	in	the	2007	EU	budget,	exceptions	on	the	revenue	side	(including	“capping”	of	the	
VAT	resource	base	at	a	percentage	of	 its	GDP)	are	applied	 in	one	way	or	another	to	no	 less	
than	16	Member	 States.	On	 the	expenditure	 side,	 the	European	Council	 of	December	2005	
provided	 the	 opportunity	 to	 grant	 to	 a	 number	 of	 regions,	 for	 different	 reasons,	 27	
supplementary	“envelopes”	totalling	€	11.2	billion.	
	
The	 European	 Parliament	 has	 observed	 that	 the	 “numerous	 exceptions	 on	 the	 revenue	 side	
and	 its	compensation	gifts	 to	certain	Member	States	on	 the	expenditure	side,	 is	 the	clearest	
proof	 of	 the	 complete	 failure	 of	 the	 current	 system”13.	 The	 evolution	 of	 the	 EU	 budget	
financing	 shows	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	 EEC	 Treaty,	 the	 system	 has	 not	
                                                
9 The main beneficiaries of this increase are Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Between 1992 
and 2005, they have collected together, on average, 58 % of all custom duties. In 2005 they received some € 2,2 
billion as collection costs, plus interest, penalties and late interest charged to the debtors.  
10 As the “UK rebate” is based on the UK share in total EU expenditure (in the Member States), any increase in the 
expenditure (in other Member States) has the effect of increasing simultaneously the volume of the “UK rebate”. 
The Commission estimated that if the correction mechanism had remained unchanged, the UK rebate” would have 
increased during the period 2007-2013 by almost 50%, from € 5 to 7 billion. 
11 The abatement is thus expected to rise from around € 5 billion/year to approximately € 6 billion averaged over 
2007-2013. This amount will, furthermore, be adjusted upwards in case of further enlargement before 2013, except 
for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. 
12 As a result, in 2007, Germany bears only 6% of the rebate and France, Italy and Spain together more than 60 %.  
13 European Parliament – Resolution on the future of the European Union's own resources, 29.3.2007, paragraph 6. 
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evolved	from	a	system	of	national	contributions	towards	one	of	genuine	EU	own	resources.	
Due	 to	 the	 different	 exceptions	 and	 specific	 arrangements	 introduced	 over	 the	 years,	 the	
system	is	in	reality	the	outcome	of	merely	intergovernmental	deals	which	tend	to	overwhelm	
other	 policy-oriented	 considerations.	 There	 is	 no	 explicit	 link	 between	 funds,	 policies	 and	
objectives,	 an	 intervention	 logic	 describing	 how	 programmes	 are	 expected	 to	 attain	 their	
global	objectives.		
	
Each	 financial	perspective	 constitutes	a	mixture	of	allocational,	 redistributive	and	 stabilising	
measures	 in	 a	 context	where	 the	 unanimous	 agreement	 of	 the	Member	 States	 is	 required.	
Indeed,	each	time	reaching	an	agreement	is	a	lengthy	enterprise.	It	took	almost	two	years	to	
agree	 on	 the	 current	 2007-2013	 financial	 perspective:	 	 four	 different	 Presidencies	 of	 the	
Council	have	dealt	with	this	sensitive	issue.	A	flavour	of	this	is	given	by	the	Council	document	
containing	 the	 last	 (and	 finally	 adopted)	 proposal.	 The	 document	 states	 that	 the	 proposal	
consists	 of	 three	 parts	 (Expenditure,	 Revenue,	 Review)	 considered	 “complementary	 and	
inseparable.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 principle	 of	 nothing	 is	 agreed	 until	 everything	 is	 agreed	
continues	to	apply”		14.	
	
2 		A	Budget	for	Europe:	Who,	Where	and	What?	
	
2.1	Drawbacks	and	Issues	of	the	Current	EU	budget		
2.1.1	The	size	of	the	federal	budgets	
If	we	compare	the	European	budget	with	those	of	federal	countries,	many	asymmetries	tend	
to	emerge.	First	of	all,	there	is	the	issue	of	the	size.	In	the	United	States,	federal	tax	revenue	
as	a	percentage	of	GDP,	averaged	15.3	and	federal	expenditure	24.0	between	2009	and	2012	
–	 the	gap	being	 filled	 through	borrowing.	 In	Australia	 income	taxes	are	 the	most	 significant	
form	of	taxation	and	are	collected	by	the	federal	government.	Good	and	Service	Tax	revenue	
is	also	collected	by	the	Federal	government,	and	then	paid	to	the	states	under	a	distribution	
formula	 determined	 by	 the	 Commonwealth	 Grants	 Commission.	 Local	 governments	 are	
funded	 largely	 by	 taxes	 on	 land	 value,	 on	 residential,	 industrial	 and	 commercial	 properties.	
Australia	maintains	a	relatively	low	tax	burden	in	comparison	with	other	wealthy,	developed	
nations,	 at	 25.6%	 of	 GDP	 in	 2013.	 In	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany,	 total	 federal	 tax	
revenue	 approximates	 10%	 of	 GDP.	 Borrowing	 is	 well	 within	 the	 EU	 treaty	 limits	 and	 is	
projected	to	go	down	to	zero	beginning	in	2015.	
 
To	give	an	idea	of	how	small	the	current	EU	budget	is,	the	table	4	shows	the	size	of	European	
total	 general	 government	 expenditures,	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 budget	 of	 some	major	 federal	
countries.	 As	 it	 is	 evident,	 in	most	 countries	 public	 budgets	 are	 quite	 considerable,	 both	 in	
terms	of	total	federal	expenditure	and	tax	revenue.		
	
Apart	 from	 its	 size,	 the	 EU	 budget	 is	 quite	 rigid	 and	 inflexible,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 previous	
section15.		
	
                                                
14 European Council, document No 1595/05 of 19.12.2005. 
15 We do not discuss here reasons and possible benefits of a EU public goods budget – the spillovers for the entire 
area – nor what these might be. See, among others, Tabellini (2002), Goulard-Nava (2002), Buti-Nava (2003), 
Cipriani-Marè (2004), Begg (2005), Lefebvre (2005), Gros-Micossi (2005). Copenaghen Economics (2011) made 
a systematic public economics analysis in a recent report while a more political proposal is suggested by Bonino-
de Andreis (2011).       
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2.1.2		The	structure	of	revenue	
In	recent	years,	the	system	of	revenue	financing	has	dramatically	changed.	In	Table	1	we	show	
the	different	weight	of	TOR	(traditional	own	resources	–	essentially	custom	duties),	VAT	and	
GNP/GNI	resource	as	a	%	of	the	total	revenue	from	1970	to	2010.	Traditional	own	resources	
(TOR)	have	declined	from	less	than	39%	to	around	13%	of	the	total	budget.	Revenue	from	VAT	
has	also	dramatically	fallen	in	the	period	considered,	plummeting	from	59%	in	1988	to	13%	in	
2004	 and	 to	 a	 mere	 10%	 in	 2011.	 The	 weight	 of	 GNP/GNI	 resource	 has	 instead	 strongly	
increased,	from	its	level	of	21%		in	1995,	to	an	astonishing	65%	of	total	revenue	in	2004	and	to	
more	 than	 75%	 in	 2013	 –	 a	 share	 substantially	 confirmed	 by	 the	 financial	 perspectives	 for	
2014-2020,	see	also	figure	1	–	even	if	the	2014	budget	envisages	a	small	reduction	to	73.6%				
	
The	increase	in	national	contributions	tends	to	change	the	nature	of	the	EU	budget,	moving	it	
away	 from	a	nation-state	budget	with	 tax-based	own	 resources	and	making	 it	 similar	 to	an	
international	organization	budget,	typically	based	on	national	contributions	such	as	the	UN’s.	
This	means	 that	budget	 resources	are	not	automatically	collected	but	decided	each	time	by	
member	countries	in	a	fully	discretional	way.	This	is	contrary	to	the	basic	principles	and	spirit	
of	 the	 then	 EEC	 and	 now	 EU;	 moreover,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 role	 of	 national	 contributions	 is	
increasing,	the	disagreement	on	net	balance	calculations	will	also	increase,	fostering	the	logic	
of	 ‘juste	 retour’	 on	 the	 European	 setting.	 A	 rising	 role	 of	 the	 fourth	 resource	 will	 force	
governments	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 simple	 logic	 of	 net	 balance,	 to	 look	 to	 the	 ‘credit	 and	 debit’	
structure.												
	
2.1.3	Net	Balance	Calculations		
More	 importantly,	 the	 computation	of	net	balances	 raises	many	doubts	 in	economic	 terms.	
Net	balance	calculations	are	usually	estimated	by	taking	the	nominal	amount	of	expenditure	
transferred	to	each	member	country.	But	 it	 is	easy	to	understand	that	this	 is	quite	different	
than	to	assess	the	real	incidence	of	the	expenditure.	In	fact,	net	balances,	by	considering	only	
the	 nominal	 destination	 of	 the	 expenditure,	 and	 not	 its	 final	 impact,	 give	 a	 picture	 of	 real	
beneficiaries	 that	 tends	 to	 be	 quite	 misleading.	 The	 map	 of	 benefits	 resulting	 from	 the	
European	budget	is	rather	incomplete.	In	fact,	the	concept	of	net	balance	disregards	the	fact	
that	 direct	 expenditure	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 member	 state	 can	 have	 significant	 effects	 on	 other	
member	 states’	 economies	 –	 as	 well	 as	 on	 non-EU	 ones:	 the	 single	 market	 and	 the	 high	
openness	of	national	economies	would	 lead	to	substantial	 spillovers	–	which	 in	 the	end	will	
translate	into	imports,	therefore	benefiting	countries	with	a	positive	external	balance16.	
	
By	using	an	 input-output	methodology,	an	official	study17	has	carried	out	a	new	estimate	of	
the	 real	and	 final	effect	of	 the	Community	expenditure	on	member	states.	The	picture	 that	
comes	out	 is	quite	divergent	 from	the	nominal	allocation	of	various	spending	 items	and	the	
final	 incidence	 of	 EU	 budget	 resources	 in	 geographic	 terms	 tend	 to	 be	 quite	 different.	
Therefore,	 the	 net	 balance	 approach	would	 conduce	 in	 the	 end,	 if	 performed	 correctly,	 to	
very	surprisingly	results.		
	
	
2.2			The	allocation	of	functions	in	a	multilevel	Europe	
The	analysis	of	the	allocation	of	functions	 in	a	multilevel	Europe	can	fruitfully	start	from	the	
lesson	of	the	fiscal	federalism	theory.	This	theory	can	give	many	useful	insights	to	the	existing	
                                                
16 See Cipriani-Marè (2003). 
17 Cipriani-Pisani (2004). 
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European	 effort	 to	 review	 the	 current	 allocation	of	 functions	 between	 the	 European	Union	
and	member	states.	Although	this	theory	has	been	developed	in	quite	different	contexts	from	
the	present	European	one,	 it	 can	be	helpful	 in	providing	guidelines	 for	 the	 future	European	
construction18.											
	
The	conventional	wisdom	–	the	conclusion	of	the	traditional	fiscal	federalism	theory	–	argues	
that	the	functions	of	redistribution	and	stabilization	should	be	attributed	to	the	central	level	
of	 government,	while	 the	 function	of	 allocation,	 in	particular	 in	 the	 case	of	 impure	or	 local	
public	goods19	should	be	transferred	to	sub	central	level,	namely	national	governments.				
	
However,	 this	 theory	has	always	been	referred	to	 federal	countries	and	has	been	applied	 in	
federalist	 contexts	 while	 the	 current	 European	 Union	 is	 quite	 far	 from	 this	 dimension.	
Moreover,	fiscal	federalism	is	per	se	a	static	theory	that	stems	from	mature	federations,	while	
the	 present-day	 EU	 needs	 a	 dynamic,	 flexible	 approach	 that	 may	 guide	 the	 institutional	
process	 and	 the	 economic	 building.	 The	 design	 of	 competence	 allocation	 in	 a	 well-settled,	
mature	 federation,	 it	 is	 quite	 an	 easy	 task,	 while	 finding	 the	 right	 mix	 of	 competence	
distribution	 in	 an	 evolving	 process,	 from	 an	 economic	 union	 to	 a	 quasi-federal	 entity,	 is	 a	
different	and	daunting	issue.		
	
What	 the	 European	 Union	 needs	 is	 a	 simple	 but	 sound	 rule	 which	 can	 help	 in	 its	 building	
process	and	in	revising	the	distribution	of	government	responsibilities	among	the	central	tier	
and	the	national	ones	along	the	road	of		European	integration.	Of	course,	this	does	not	imply	
that	 the	 path	 has	 been	 definitely	 charted	 and	 that	 we	 are	 bound	 to	 move	 to	 a	 federal	
dimension.	Even	better,	recent	institutional	developments	seems	to	show	that	the	European	
Union	can	even	remain	a	single	market	or	a	simple	economic	union;	but	a	flexible	blueprint	is	
needed.																	
	
3.	 What	Consumption	Tax	in	a	Multilevel	Framework?		
3.1	 	 Bringing	the	EU	closer	to	European	population	
A	 strong	 increase	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 transparency	 of	 European	public	 finances	would	 help	 to	
avoid	recurrent	crisis	and	bring	the	Union	closer	to	European	population;	most	of	all,	it	might		
reveal	the	true	intentions	of	European	governments	on	Europe’s	future.	A	way	of	moving	far	
from	egoism	and	‘juste	retour’	approach	and	to	step	in	for	the	building	of	a	new	Europe.	
	
The	composition	of	revenue	has	to	be	changed.	National	contributions	that	foster	egoism	and	
lessen	solidarity	must	be	reduced	and	scaled	down	and	a	new	base	for	a	European	tax	has	to	
be	 found.	 This	 tax	has	 to	put	 into	 a	 closer	 connection	 the	EU	 to	 the	European	 citizens	 and	
increase	people	awareness	of	costs	and	benefits	of	Europe.	The	real	issue	of	nowadays	Europe	
is	not	that	there	is	too	much,	but	that	there	is	too	little	Europe.	The	original	plan	to	start	from	
a	 single	 currency	 to	 develop	 a	more	 federal	 Europe	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 inconsistent	 and	 not	
successful.	We	have	to	match	the	ECB	with	a	European	Minister	of	Economy	and	Finance.									
	
                                                
18 See on the theory of fiscal federalism Musgrave (1959, 1969), Musgrave-Musgrave (1973), Oates (1968, 1972) 
and Olson (1969). A more recent discussion is in Oates (1999, 2002) von Hagen (2002). In the European context 
this approach was explicitly adopted by the MacDougall Report in 1977, which suggested a new assignment of 
functions between states and the European Commission and a strong increase in the size of the Union budget.  
19 The supply of local, or club, goods should be given to local governments so as to make sure that the benefit – or 
correspondence – principle be assured. 
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The	share	of	tax-based	own	resources	in	the	total	budget	has	to	be	increased.	The	reform	of	
the	financing	system	should	be	based	on	a	tax	that	explicitly	aims	at	financing	the	European	
institutions	and	their	budget	and	at	removing	the	main	pitfalls	of	the	current	system,	i.e.	the	
absence	of	a	direct	link	with	EU	citizens.			
	
We	 do	 not	 have	 to	 go	 that	 far	 to	 find	 a	 ‘new	 fiscal	 resource’	 for	 the	 EU.	 Current	 VAT	 has	
already	 a	 sufficient	 tax	 base	 harmonization.	 The	 existence	 of	 regional	 arbitrariness	 or	 the	
presence	of	cross-border	externalities	are	strong	arguments	for	assigning	a	part	or	all	of	the	
corresponding	tax	revenue	to	the	EU	level20.	However,	given	the	current	working	of	VAT,	the	
definition	of	a	new	tax	resource	for	the	budget,	“imply	a	decision	on	sharing	either	revenue	or	
tax	 rates	between	 the	national	and	 the	EU	 level”,	which	nevertheless	should	 finance	half	of	
the	budget21.	The	current	GNI-based	resource	will	remain	as	the	residual	balancing	resource.	
The	merit	of	VAT,	as	a	new	fiscal	resource,	is	that	it	would	allow	to	replace	the	‘statistical	VAT’	
–	 i.e.,	 the	 current	way	of	 calculating	 the	VAT	 tax	base	 for	 the	European	budget	by	national	
administrations	–	with	the	real	working	of	the	tax	–	i.e.,	the	tax	returns.	
3.2		 Tax	Assignment	and	Inter-jurisdictional	Coordination	of	Sales	Taxes		
As	 suggested	 by	Musgrave22,	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 taxing	 and	 auditing	 powers	 among	 lower-
level	governments,	in	mature	federations	and	in	pre-federal	entities	and	economic	unions,	the	
key	issue	is:	‘Who	Should	Tax,	Where	and	What?’	
But	“Who	should	tax	what?”	does	not	give	a	full	account	of	the	tax	assignment	problem.	As	
suggested	 by	McLure	 (2001)	we	must	 add	 “and	 how?”	 To	 fully	 address	 the	 tax	 assignment	
problem	we	have	to	answer	 five	questions:	“a)	which	 level	of	government	gets	 the	revenue	
from	a	particular	 tax;	2)	which	 level	 chooses	 the	 taxes	 that	a	 given	 level	 imposes;	3)	which	
defines	 the	 tax	 bases;	 4)	 which	 sets	 tax	 rates;	 and	 5)	which	 administers	 the	 various	 taxes.	
Where	subnational	governments	lack	control	over	all	these	decisions—but	especially	control	
over	 tax	 rates—there	 will	 be	 vertical	 fiscal	 imbalance,	 even	 if	 subnational	 revenues	 are	
adequate	 to	 meet	 expenditure	 needs.	 Tax	 assignment	 is	 not	 so	 much	 about	 the	 overall	
adequacy	of	revenue	as	about	control	over	marginal	sources	of	revenue”23.		
It	 is	 clear	 that,	 from	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 federalist	 experience,	 tax	 assignment	 is	 not	 a	 static	
choice,	but	somewhat	‘a	moving	target’.	“There	may	be	a	tendency	to	believe	that	proper	tax	
assignment	can	be	described,	once	and	for	all,	as	based	on	first	principles.	In	fact,	this	is	not	
true,	 because	 knowledge	 of	 both	 tax	 technology	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 taxation	 change	 and	
because	 economies	 evolve”24.	 The	 conventional	wisdom	 about	 tax	 assignment	may	 change	
                                                
20 See European Commission (2004).  
21 For example, the EU share could be levied “as part of the national rate paid by taxpayers. The total EU budget, 
anyway limited by the own resources ceiling to a maximum of 1.24% of EU-GNI, would not increase, as revenue 
from the tax-based resource would be offset by a corresponding decrease of the current GNI-based resource”, 
European Commission (2004). 
22 Musgrave (1983). See also Musgrave (1959, 1969), Musgrave-Musgrave (1973), Oates (1968, 1972, 1977a, 
1977b, 1999, 2002), King (1984), Bird (1989, 1999), McLure (1993, 2000b, 2001).  
23 Bird (1999) wrote “meaningful tax assignment refers to the assignment of the ability (and responsibility) to 
determine own revenues in some meaningful way. Subnational governments may be fully financed from what they 
(and others) may consider their “own” taxes. But if, as is often the case in developing countries, they cannot 
decide which taxes they levy, what the tax bases are, what rates are imposed, or how intensively taxes are enforced 
they actually have no control at all over revenues and hence have really been “assigned” no revenue power at the 
margin—though perhaps much revenue. The single most critical variable from this perspective is control over the 
effective tax rate. 
24  See McLure (2001). 
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with	the	growth	of	knowledge:	economic	and	political	progress	may	alter	what	we	believe	can	
be	 a	 proper	 or	 efficient	 tax	 assignment.	 So	 the	 issue	 needs	 to	 be	 defined	 and	 redefined	
according	 to	 historical	 development	 and	 the	 different	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	
structure	of	various	countries	at	different	times,	as	well	as	to	the	economic	and	public	finance	
conditions	and	some	political	economy	considerations.		
However,	 when	 one	 has	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 subdivide	 the	 power	 to	 tax	 in	 a	 multilevel	
government	context	–	both	federal	and	unitary	–	a	very	important	issue	is	the	possible	forms	
of	 vertical	 coordination	 of	 sales	 taxation;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 how	 to	 allocate	 the	 taxing	 power	
among	the	different	levels	of	government,	what	sales	tax	is	better	to	use,	how	to	assign	the	
tax	 revenue25	 -	 or	 eventually,	what	 sharing	 formula	might	be	used	–	 and	 finally	how	 to	 set	
rates	and	bases.	In	Table	5,	we	present	the	9	possible	options	available,	including	the	case	of	
no	 taxation,	 for	 the	 two	most	 important	 levels	of	government,	 the	 federal/national	and	the	
state26.	We	limit	our	analysis	only	to	the	two	superior	–	and	from	an	economic	point	of	view,	
identical	–	forms	of	consumption	taxes:	the	VAT	and	the	retail	sales	tax	(RST)27,	and	we	do	not	
consider	other	lower	levels	of	government28.		
Disregarding	 the	 case	 of	 no	 taxation	 –	 cell	 9	 –	 the	 first	 two	 interesting	 options	 are	 those	
situated	along	the	principal	diagonal	(1	and	5),	i.e.,	the	case	of	a	dual	VAT	and	a	dual	RST.	In	
recent	years,	some	cases	of	a	dual	VAT	solution	have	emerged:	most	of	them	have	been	using	
the	 same	 tax	 bases	 for	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 government,	while	 rates	 applied	 have	diverged	 in	
some	 cases.	 The	 dual	 RST	 is	 up	 to	 now	 only	 a	 theoretical	 option,	 although	 it	 has	 been	
considered	in	the	economic	debate	in	the	US	as	a	possible	form	of	a	joint	federal-state	tax	on	
consumption.	The	most	appealing	case	is	instead,	as	we	discuss	more	in	detail	in	the	following	
section,	the	option	2	(VAT	+	RST),	even	if	some	interesting	and	positive	suggestions	come	from	
the	case	8	(RST	at	the	state	level).	Option	2	is	perhaps	the	best	practical	solution	for	the	EU	
and	 it	 is	 puzzling	 that	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 substantially	 disregarded	 it,	
notwithstanding	some	growing	consensus	in	the	academic	circles.	Option	8	is	the	US’	way	of	
taxing	consumption.	While,	being	realistic,	there	is	no	chance	now	in	Europe	to	use	this	form	
of	 consumption	 tax,	 the	 debate	 on	 reforming	 European	 VAT	 should	 seriously	 consider	 the	
lessons	and	 the	positive	–	we	may	also	say	 ‘federal’	–	properties	of	 the	single	 stage	way	of	
taxing	 consumption.	 Finally,	 option	 7,	 a	 state	 VAT,	 is	 the	 solution	 currently	 used	 in	 the	
European	Union,	where	a	form	of	taxation	by	the	federal	level	is	still	not	contemplated	in	the	
                                                
25 A good discussion of these aspects is made by Bird (1989), Burgess-Howes-Stern (1995), Bird-Gendron 
(1998).  
26 With ‘state’ we mean the intermediate or sub-national level of government, not the various forms of local 
governments, even if as it well known, many local governments largely use and rely on some forms of general and 
specific sales taxes.   
27 We do not examine here the other possible forms of VAT – for example, all the variants of the VAT income-
type, etc. – or other forms of single stage taxation, such as, the producer tax – like the manufacturer tax, previously 
existing in Canada – or the tax on the wholesaler – as with the British wholesale tax. 
28 Of course, consumption taxes can also be designed and implemented by lower levels of government, such as 
provinces and communes or local districts. In the ancient Rome, but also in the present time, we have had good 
examples of consumption taxes and duties collected at a very low level of government. Of course, the lower the 
level at which the consumption tax is levied, the bigger the problems we may face in terms of cross border-
shopping and trade distortions. The argument that a certain or limited degree of cross-border shopping will be 
always damaging efficiency is however quite far from being settled in theoretical and empirical terms. In fact, in 
general terms all taxes tend to produce some cross-border shopping and a partial bases and revenue reallocation – 
take for example, the tax exporting that emerges from some form of local business and company taxation. The real 
question is not to ask ’how much tax harmonization should we expect to realize’, rather ‘how much tax diversity 
can we allow’ without hampering the functioning of the single market, or so as to avoid tax distortions and 
economic inefficiency. See on this Cnossen (1998, 2002) and Sinn (1993).                     
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near	future.	The	European	Union	should	look	for	in	this	menu	what	might	be	the	best	possible	
combination	 of	 consumption	 taxes	 for	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 future	 of	 the	 Union.	We	
believe	that	current	VATs	at	the	state	level	may	and	should	be	improved	with	some	reform	of	
the	tax	design.					
3.3		 The	use	of	consumption	taxes	at	national	and	intermediate	level	in	federal	and	unitary	
countries29		
In	Table	6	and	in	the	Appendix	we	show	the	current	situation	in	the	most	 important	federal	
countries	and	in	the	EU.	Countries	with	the	oldest	federal	tradition,	such	as	the	United	States,	
Canada	but	also	India	and	Brazil,	have	used	forms	of	sales	taxes	relatively	different	to	those	
used	 in	 the	 European	Union	 –	 and	 the	 same	 also	 applies	 in	 part	 for	 Argentina.	 The	United	
States	makes	 use	 of	 a	 retail	 sales	 tax	 at	 the	 state	 level,	without	 levying	 any	 form	of	 tax	 at	
federal	level,	but	imposing	various	kind	of	local	sales	taxes.	Canada	is	instead	using	different	
forms	of	VAT	by	both	 levels	of	government,	and	in	some	provinces	a	federal	VAT	is	coupled	
with	a	retail	sales	tax.	India	has	recently	introduced	a	state	VAT	that	operates	together	with	a	
federal	VAT	and	the	same	applies	also	 in	Brazil	–	the	federal	VATs	 in	both	countries	are	not	
levied	on	a	 comprehensive	base	and	 states’	VATs	are	working	with	an	origin-based	 system.	
Germany	and	Austria	have	made	recourse	to	VAT,	even	if	with	a	central	management;	the	tax	
is	 then	 paid	 back	 to	 the	 Länder	 or	 regions	 with	 a	 tax	 sharing	 mechanism	 based	 on	 some	
criteria	 such	 as	 consumption	 base,	 population,	 and	 the	 like;	 the	 same	 does	 not	 occur	 in	
Switzerland	 and	 Belgium,	 where	 the	 revenue	 remain	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 and	 the	 states’	
autonomy	is	practically	insignificant,	and	in	Australia,	where	although	there	is	not	a	state	sales	
tax,	all	 the	revenue	of	 the	 federal	VAT	goes	to	states.	Finally,	 the	European	Union	does	not	
have	any	federal	tax	on	consumption	and	existing	VATs	are	levied	only	at	the	state	level.	In	a	
similar	context,	we	also	find	Mexico	which	applies	however	a	different	criterion	from	the	EU	
in	taxing	interstate	trade.		
In	 Table	 7	 we	 account	 for	 all	 the	 various	 experiences	 in	 taxing	 consumption	 and	 sales	 for	
major	 federal	countries.	Most	countries	decided	to	adopt	some	form	of	 federal	VAT	even	 if	
not	always	coupled	with	a	specific	sales	tax	at	the	state/regional	level	–	even	a	VAT	or	a	retail	
sales	tax.	In	the	third	column	we	show	how	the	tax	revenue	is	in	the	end	allocated	among	the	
various	level	of	government	and	the	type	of	state/region	tax	used	by	this	intermediate	level	of	
government.	With	the	only	exception	of	the	United	States	and	India,	most	federal	countries	
have	adopted	in	the	last	twenty	years	a	form	of	federal	VAT.	Canada	is	the	most	 interesting	
experience,	where	an	original	mix	of	federal	sales	tax	(VAT)	and	state	sales	tax	(VAT	+	RST)	has	
been	 implemented.	 Some	 countries	 use	 together	 with	 a	 federal	 tax	 also	 a	 state	 sales	 tax,	
which	is	in	most	cases	a	VAT	–	the	most	notable	exception	are	Australia	(no	state	tax)	and	the	
European	federal	countries	 (Germany,	Belgium,	Austria,	Switzerland	with	only	a	 federal	VAT	
and	no	state	tax).	A	particular	case	is	that	of	the	European	Union,	where	no	tax	is	applied	at	
the	 federal	 level	and	the	European	VAT	 is	only	 levied	at	 the	state	 level.	 It	 is	 therefore	clear	
that	the	European	Union	shows	on	sales	taxation	an	explicit	asymmetry	when	compared	with	
other	major	federal	countries.	
3.4		 Taxing	Consumption	at	the	State	Level	
Real	options	states	might	have	to	tax	consumption	in	a	federal	context	are	a	quite	neglected	
matter,	both	 in	 theoretical	and	empirical	 literature.	This	 is	particularly	 true	 in	 the	European	
Union	 and	 by	 and	 large	 in	 European	 studies.	 There	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 irony	 here	 given	 that	 these	
                                                
29 In this work we limit our analysis only to the most important federal countries.   
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options	have	been	one	of	 the	most	crucial	 issues	 in	 federal	countries30.	But	probably	 this	 is	
also	the	explanation	of	 the	paradox!	 In	 fact,	a	 true	road	to	 fiscal	 federalism	has	never	been	
seriously	carried	out	and	genuinely	performed	 in	Europe,	both	by	European	 institutions	and	
particularly	by	the	founding	countries	of	the	EC31.	Tout	comptes	fait,	what	could	be	the	reason	
to	discuss	the	advantages	of	a	fiscal	federalism’s	agenda	for	Europe	–	the	coordination	of	the	
federal	and	state	taxation	–	if	the	road	chosen	is	rather	different?								
In	 abstract	 terms,	 with	 regard	 to	 sales	 taxes,	 there	 are	 4	 possible	 general	 options	 for	 the	
states	–	see	table	12:	1)	a	national	sales	tax	with	a	revenue	sharing	mechanism;	2)	an	origin-
based	 tax,	 with	 two	 possible	 sub-options,	 a	 VAT	 with	 uniform	 or	 variable	 rates;	 3)	 a	
destination-based	tax,	such	as	a	retail	sales	tax	or	a	VAT	with	the	same	sub-options	of	uniform	
and	variable	rates;	4)	finally,	a	joint	federal-state	tax	(a	dual	VAT)32.						
Option	1	could	be	considered	as	the	simplest	way	of	 taxing	consumption	for	states	within	a	
multitier	government.	 In	this	option,	the	tax	 is	 imposed	at	a	uniform	rate	across	the	nation,	
and	the	 interstate	trade	of	goods	does	not	require	any	special	adjustment.	The	tax	revenue	
collected,	both	directly	by	the	federal	government	or	states,	is	then	shared	between	them	on	
the	 basis	 of	 some	 formula	 of	 apportionment	 –	 for	 example,	 final	 consumption,	 population,	
etc.	 Germany	 and	 Austria	 extensively	 use	 this	 type	 of	 arrangement	 in	 the	working	 of	 VAT.	
Notwithstanding	its	simplicity,	this	option	removes	any	fiscal	autonomy	for	the	intermediate	
levels	of	government	in	defining	and	levying	tax	rates	and	bases;	for	this	reasons,	it	does	not	
seem	to	be	the	best	option	for	a	federation	where	the	states’	power	is	crucial	–	e.g.,	the	EU	in	
its	current	stage	of	development.						
Option	2	uses	 the	origin	principle	on	 inter-states	sales,	not	 the	destination.	The	solution	 for	
granting	 states	 a	 large	 room	of	manoeuvre	 in	managing	 different	 rates	 raises	many	 issues:	
first,	the	presence	of	multiple	rates	with	the	origin	principle	tends	to	produce	a	misallocation	
of	 resources	 and	 business	 activities.	 Trade	 and	 location	 of	 production	 activities	 would	 be	
affected,	while	the	system	of	revenue	collection	and	compensation	would	be	very	difficult	to	
manage	 for	 tax	 administration33.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 other	 sub-option	 of	 a	 VAT	with	 a	
uniform	rate	would	ease	the	economic	negative	effects34	but	would	abolish	states	autonomy	
                                                
30  A noteworthy exception is Poddar (1990, 104) who wrote, “When state governments impose general indirect 
taxes, they use a single-stage retail sales tax. […] It is generally believed that without such frontiers state 
VATs would need to be based on the origin principle (as opposed to the destination principle) for interstate 
sales. An origin-based VAT could, however, distort the location of economic activity unless the tax was 
imposed at a uniform rate in all the states”. 
31  A brilliant exception is the MacDougall Report (1977) where a public finance agenda for Europe was set up. 
The Report suggested many good proposals to improve the working of the EU public finance: among the 
various proposals, it is important to stress the reform of the European budget, with a new financing mechanism 
based on VAT, and the discussion of the possible candidates of a European tax – a European corporate tax, a 
common VAT, a tax on energy and not renewable resources, some environmental taxes, etc..         
32  The analysis is based on Poddar (1990). See also Bird-Gendron (1998, 2001). 
33  Multiple rates would induce business and firms to locate their activities in states with the lowest tax rate; in the 
same time, other strategic behaviors would be possible: e.g., importers would change their shipments so that 
“the initial point of entry would be the state with the lowest rate”, or again the different rates would encourage 
activities such as “direct shopping in low-tax jurisdictions and sales through mail order” (Poddar, 1990, p. 
107). Moreover, as discussed below, the equivalence theorem demonstrates the similarity between the origin 
and the destination principle but this identity is based on assumption which do not exist in real world, and 
particularly in the nowadays EU: perfect flexible exchange rates, full flexible prices, immobile factors of 
productions and balanced trade!      
34  This is not at all evident given that if VAT rates were identical across the states, then “it could be argued that 
firms would have no incentive to misstate the values. […][But] even if firms were indifferent about the 
division of tax base among states, the states would not be” (emph. add.) (Poddar, 1990, 106).   
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and	 leave	 unaffected	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 revenue	 redistribution	 among	 the	 Member	 States.	
Moreover,	 a	 uniform	 rate	 is	 not	 politically	 achievable	 in	 the	 current	 situation.	 Finally,	 the	
origin	principle	would	not	allow	the	flow	of	tax	revenue	to	be	assigned	to	the	state	where	final	
consumption	takes	place.	
Option	3	is	based	on	the	destination	principle	and	the	solutions	of	a	Retail	Sales	Tax	or	a	VAT.	
Both	 of	 them	 let	 the	 final	 revenue	 from	 sales	 taxation	 go	 to	 the	 jurisdictions	 where	 final	
consumption	of	goods	and	 services	 takes	place.	 It	 is	 clear	 that,	 from	 the	economic	point	of	
view,	 the	 destination-based	 taxes	 meet	 the	 criteria	 of	 economic	 neutrality	 and	 fiscal	
autonomy35.	 However	 RST	 and	 VAT	 have	 very	 different	 implications	 on	 the	 need	 of	 fiscal	
frontiers,	border	adjustments,	 tax	compliance	and	administration.	The	presumed	superiority	
of	VAT	over	the	RST	is	far	from	being	proved	and	some	further	analysis	is	needed.	Quite	the	
opposite,	 if	we	 cosider	 possible	 effects	 on	 international	 trade,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 border	 tax	
adjustments	 and	 the	 need	 of	 a	 clearing	mechanism	 to	 reallocate	 the	 tax	 revenue,	 the	 RST	
seems	superior	to	VAT.	Differently	to	VAT,	the	RST	does	not	need	in	fact	any	special	provisions	
to	relieve	interstate	sales	from	the	tax	they	may	have	borne	in	the	state	of	origin;	but	 if	we	
consider	 also	 the	 issues	 of	 compliance	 and	 tax	 administration,	 VAT	 may	 finally	 offset	 this	
initial	disadvantage.	However,	this	aspect	is	discussed	below	in	par.	4.1	and	4.2.																		
Finally,	there	is	the	interesting	option	(4)	of	a	dual	VAT,	i.e.,	of	a	joint	national	(federal)-state	
VAT.	This	option	is	similar	to	option	1	but	instead	of	using	a	revenue-sharing	arrangement	is	
organized	with	two	components:	a	federal	(national)	VAT	levied	at	a	uniform	rate	across	the	
country	 and	 a	 state	 VAT	 with	 variable	 rates	 across	 the	 states.	 This	 solution	 offers	 many	
positive	 aspects,	 mainly	 the	 possibility	 of	 piggy-backing	 between	 the	 two	 taxes	 and	 the	
potential	 strengthening	 of	 tax	 enforcement	 and	 collection.	 All	 this	 requires	 however	 some	
extensive	degree	of	coordination	among	the	federal	government	and	states.	Although	the	EU	
does	 not	 seem	 at	 this	 time	 ready	 or	 prepared	 to	 adopt	 this	 option,	 nor	 the	 foreseeable	
political	developments	 in	 the	Union	 induce	 to	be	optimistic	on	 this	 regard,	 this	 solution,	 as	
already	proved	by	the	Canadian	experience,	could	be	a	good	compromise	for	an	efficient	and	
stable	design	of	the	European	VAT.	This	solution	is	discussed	in	par.	4.2.	
	
4 Financing	 the	EU	budget	by	means	of	a	 true	 tax	own-resource	based:	what	possible	
solutions?		
	
4.1	Reasons	for	a	New	VAT	for	the	EU	(budget):	A	Politically	Feasible	Consumption	Tax	for	
the	EU		
The	 system	of	 own	 resources	 for	 financing	 the	 EU	 budget	 is	 at	 a	 turning	 point.	 The	 recent	
crisis	and	difficulties	in	the	process	of	adopting	the	new	Financial	Perspectives	forces	member	
States	 to	 find	 a	 stable	 and	 viable	 solution	 to	 the	 Community	 finances.	 In	 this	 respect,	 one	
crucial	 feature	 is	 re-examining	 the	 rationale	 and	 working	 of	 the	 European	 budget.	 More	
significantly,	 setting	up	a	new	 financing	mechanism	 for	 the	EU	budget	would	not	only	 cope	
with	its	recent	crisis	but	would	also	offer	a	good	chance	of	rethinking	EU	missions	and	roles.	
With	 some	 exceptions36,	 the	 issue	 of	 financing	 has	 been	 surprisingly	 neglected	 in	 the	 last	
years’	 discussions	 that	 have	 been	 essentially	 concentrated	 on	 the	 expenditure	 side.	 We	
review	 the	main	 issues	of	 current	 financing	mechanism	and	 suggest	 some	possible	ways	of	
reforming	the	VAT	regime	and	the	budget	financing	of	the	European	Union.		
                                                
35  See on this, the three criteria discussed in point 3.3.   
36 See for example, Cipriani-Marè (2004), Gros-Micossi (2005), Begg (2005), Amato-Marè (2005), Lefebvre 
(2005), Cipriani (2006), Emerson et al. (2006) Le Cacheux (2005, 2007).  
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There	are	some	clear	standpoints	from	which	one	needs	to	start:	
a) As	for	any	budget,	both	of	federal	and	unitary	countries,	the	tax	revenue	must	be	founded	
on	tax-based	own	resources	and	relies	only	residually	on	the	GNI	‘fourth	resource’;	
b) the	 system	 of	 budget	 financing	 has	 to	 become	 more	 transparent	 and	 less	 complex.	
European	citizens	have	to	be	fully	informed	and	aware	of	what	and	how	much	they	pay	as	tax	
revenue	to	the	EU;	
c) the	methodology	 to	 calculate	 net	 balances	 is	 not	 well	 grounded	 in	 economic	 terms.	 It	
does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 economic	 theory	 of	 tax	 incidence	 and	 therefore	 the	 final	
picture	is	misleading.	Net	balance	calculations	aiming	at	assessing	the	real	beneficiaries	of	the	
EU	budget	resources	are	biased;		
d) although	 one	 may	 think	 to	 possible	 operational	 solutions,	 there	 is	 a	 quick	 and	 easy	
solution	to	the	financing	issue	of	the	EU	budget.	VAT	is	the	best	candidate	for	this	role,	given	
its	wide-ranging	spread	and	the	large	harmonization	of	the	tax	base.	
e) However,	the	current	working	of	VAT	shows	some	drawbacks	and	therefore	the	existing	
VAT	 is	unsuitable	for	this	purpose.	VAT	needs	to	be	ambitiously	reshaped	–	 in	particular,	 its	
practical	 functioning	–	so	as	 to	achieve	a	genuine,	neutral	consumption	tax,	whose	revenue	
should	flow	to	countries	where	final	consumption	takes	place.	
f) The	best	economic	and	practical	 solution	 is	 to	move	 to	a	pre-retail	VAT	 coupled	with	a	
retail	sales	tax	at	the	state	level.	This	new	VAT	–	FCT	(final	consumption	tax)	–	may	not	only	
solve	the	old	question	of	the	VAT	‘definitive	regime’,	but	also	be	a	perfect	source	of	revenue	
for	the	EU	budget.	This	solution	could	be	 implemented	with	some	very	easy	adjustments	to	
the	current	working	of	VAT.	The	mechanism	would	simply	rely	on	a	single,	identical	rate	–	but	
not	for	this	harmonized	–	levied	on	transactions	among	VAT	taxpayers	within	the	EU,	whose	
revenue	might	flow	partially	or	fully	to	the	EU	budget.	
	
There	are	therefore	plenty	of	solutions	for	choosing	a	EU	consumption	tax:	from	a	single	stage	
tax,	like	the	RST	of	the	USA,	to	a	Dual	VAT,	a	federal	VAT	up	to	a	mix	of	a	pre-retail	VAT	with	a	
retail	 sales	 tax	 levied	 at	 the	 state	 level.	 A	 federal	 or	 a	 European	 VAT	would	 clearly	 be	 the	
easiest,	 most	 practical	 solution,	 in	 terms	 of	 tax	 coordination	 among	 the	 various	 level	 of	
governments,	especially	for	administrative	purpose.	A	European	VAT	would	solve	by	definition	
the	issue	of	the	EU	budget	financing;	more	specifically,	given	that	the	revenue	would	flow	to	
the	central	budget,	any	issues	of	tax	clearing	would	be	automatically	worked	out.	However,	a	
federal	VAT	would	inevitably	and	dramatically	exacerbate	the	most	sensible	political	 issue	in	
Europe	 in	the	domain	of	taxation:	states’	 freedom	to	tax	consumption	 independently	would	
inevitably	be	limited.	Some	federal	countries	have	chosen	a	similar	solution	–	like	Canada	and	
Germany	 (with	 a	 revenue	 reapportionment	 in	 line	 with	 indicators	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	
consumption	among	Länder)	–	but	the	European	Union	does	not	seem	ready	to	this	stage	of	
development	and	we	wonder	whether	it	will	be	ever	able	to	achieve	this	level	of	integration.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	on	the	opposite	spectrum	of	consumption	taxes,	there	is	the	solution	of	a	
single	stage	tax	on	the	final	point	of	retail,	as	in	the	experience	of	USA	and	India37.	If	two	of	
the	most	important	federal	countries	have	chosen	the	solution	of	a	retail	sales	tax,	this	should	
not	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 coincidence.	 RSTs	 are	 the	 most	 respectful	 solution	 for	 state	 autonomy	
insofar	as	 they	 leave	states	 free	of	 taxing	 their	consumption	base.	Moreover,	being	a	single	
stage	 tax,	 RSTs	 easily	 solve	 problems	 of	 inter-state	 trade	 –	 no	 clearing	 mechanism	 is	
                                                
37 Paradoxically, few months ago India decided to move to VAT. But its adoption appears very complicated and 
many states have refused its endorsement until now choosing to stick to the traditional retail sales taxes. 
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necessary,	 nor	 border	 tax	 adjustments.	 But	 we	 have	 to	 admit,	 the	 European	 experience	 is	
based	 on	 VAT	 and	 a	 RST,	 even	 if	more	 federal	 in	 its	 nature,	 could	 be	 politically	 difficult	 to	
implement38.										
	
But	some	good	and	interesting	compromises	can	be	envisaged	looking	at	some	intermediate	
solutions.	A	Dual	VAT	has	proved	to	be	a	good	tax	and	showed	a	good	performance	in	Canada	
and	other	federal	countries;	but	 in	the	EU	we	are	not	yet	at	this	stage	of	development.	This	
solution	consists	 in	applying	a	VAT	at	both	levels	of	government:	the	federal	VAT	applies	on	
the	 same	 base	 of	 the	 state	 VAT.	 The	 best	 practical	 and	 politically	 feasible	 solution	 for	 the	
European	Union	is	however	to	get	a	pre-retail	VAT	with	a	RST	at	the	state	level.	This	solution	
may	offer	many	relevant	advantages	for	state	tax	autonomy	and	strong	simplification	of	the	
definitive	regime	of	EU	VAT.	Finally,	this	is	the	easiest	solution	to	put	also	forward	a	new	way	
of	financing	the	EU	budget.				
	
4.2		Using	VAT	for	taxing	consumption	and	financing	the	EU	budget	
	
4.2.1	Solving	the	current	dilemma	of	EU	VAT		
With	the	long-term	aim	to	shift	to	a	definitive	origin-based	regime,	from	the	1st	January	1993	a	
temporary	 regime	 has	 been	 adopted.	 This	 regime	 still	 applies	 the	 destination	 principle	 but	
without	using	BTAs,	 i.e.,	 the	 fiscal	adjustments	 to	 frontier	posts.	The	destination	principle	–	
goods	 and	 services	 are	 still	 taxed	 according	 to	 the	 rate	 of	 the	 country	 where	 final	
consumption	takes	place	–	is	applied	with	a	different	operational	mechanism.	If	before	1993,	
tax	adjustments	among	countries,	for	the	application	of	a	zero	rate	to	exports,	were	made	at	
customs	posts,	where	the	imported	good	was	taxed,	now	BTAs	are	levied	by	the	first	importer	
who	takes	into	account	in	his	books	the	value	added	tax	related	to	imports.		
	
This	temporary	regime	has	raised	many	issues:	i)	it	has	considerably	increased	the	risk	of	tax	
fraud	 and	 has	 been	 criticized	 by	 national	 administrations	 for	 this	 motive	 and	 for	 making	
controls	 difficult	 and	 complex,	 but	 also,	 for	 reducing	 the	 states’	 power	 in	 monitoring	 the	
working	 of	 VATs;	 ii)	 in	 the	 European	 area	 do	 now	 exist,	 de	 facto,	 three	 different	 taxing	
regimes,	which	render	compliance	for	firms	and	administrations	quite	burdensome;	iii)	there	
is	still	a	market	segmentation	and	the	same	rule	of	taxation	had	not	been	applied;	iv)	finally,	
the	zero	rating	tends	to	 interrupts	the	VAT	chain,	that	 is	to	say,	to	weaken	the	VAT	chain39,	
the	self-policing	mechanism	which	is	one	of	the	most	important	advantage	of	the	multistage	
way	of	taxing	consumption,	as	with	VAT.	
	
During	these	years,	the	Commission	has	tried	to	move	to	a	definitive	regime,	where	the	origin	
principle	 will	 be	 applied.	 However,	 the	 origin	 regime	 would	 require	 not	 only	 a	 clearing	
mechanism,	 to	 compensate	 states	 for	 intra-EU	 trade,	but	also	a	 complete	unification	of	 tax	
rates	 across	 the	 EU.	 This	 full	 harmonization	 is	 not	 only	 politically	 unachievable	 but	 also	
unnecessary	 in	 a	modern	 framework	 of	 assigning	 taxing	 powers	 to	 lower-level	 jurisdictions	
within	the	EU.	For	these	reasons	the	shift	to	the	origin	principle	has	been	de	facto	set	aside.	
                                                
38 The traditional argument in favour of VAT based on its superiority in terms of compliance, the so called self-
policing mechanism – or conflict of interests – is largely overstated. See on this Marè (2006) and Leccisotti-Marè 
(1992).      
39 The Commission in the document for a new common system of VAT (COM96, 328 final, p. 13) has admitted 
that the current temporary regime provokes “a real loss of sovereignty over tax matters ; this is because the 
fragmentation of the activities of taxable persons between the various Member States prevents administrations 
from being able to monitor the overall activity of a firm”. 
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Although	it	has	been	reaffirming	the	objective	of	the	origin	principle	in	the	long	run,	in	the	last	
years	 the	 European	 Commission40	 wisely	 acknowledged	 that	 in	 order	 to	 leave	 to	 VAT	 the	
nature	of	a	consumption	tax,	and	especially	to	meet	the	will	of	states	to	have	a	certain	room	
of	manoeuvre	in	taxing	consumption,	the	destination	principle	will	finally	be	retained,	so	as	to	
allocate	VAT	 revenue	 to	 states	where	 final	 consumption	of	 goods	 and	 services	 takes	 place.	
The	new	guidelines	move	in	the	right	direction,	the	only	compatible	with	a	true	and	genuine	
taxation	of	consumption.	The	destination	is	the	unique	principle	compatible	with	a	true	tax	on	
final	consumption.	Of	course,	in	designing	a	new	regime,	costs	and	burdens	for	firms	and	VAT	
taxpayers,	that	are	not	negligible,	have	to	be	taken	carefully	into	consideration.	But	in	doing	
so,	 one	must	not	 forget	 that	VAT	 is	 a	 tax	on	 final	 consumption;	 i.e.,	 tax	 revenue	has	 to	be	
assigned	to	states	where	final	consumption	is	deemed	to	take	place	–	easing	at	the	same	time	
compliance	burdens	for	operators.		See	table	13	and	14	for	the	current	still	strongly	divergent	
situation	in	VAT	rates	within	the	European	Union.		
	
4.2.2		A	new	EU	consumption	tax	for	financing	the	budget	and	allowing	states’	autonomy	
An	own	resources	system	based	on	VAT	appears	to	be	the	best	solution.	VAT	is	already	one	of	
the	main	sources	of	the	budget,	even	if	its	weight	and	role	has	been	decreasing	in	the	last	few	
years.	Due	to	 its	direct	 link	with	daily	consumption,	and	contrary	to	the	current	“statistical”	
VAT	resource,	the	application	of	an	EU	rate	to	national	VAT	bases	would	create	a	clear	direct	
link	 between	 the	 financing	 of	 the	 EU	 budget	 and	 the	 citizen	 and	 increase	 awareness	 on	
Union’s	costs.	A	genuinely	fiscal	VAT	resource	could	be	implemented	through	a	EU	rate	as	a	
part	of	the	national	VAT	rate	paid	by	taxpayers.	The	rate	would	be	 levied	together	with	the	
national	 rate	 on	 the	 same	 taxable	 base.	 Citizens	 would	 not	 have	 to	 bear	 any	 additional	
burden,	as	the	EU	rate	would	be	offset	by	an	equivalent	decrease	of	the	national	VAT	rate41.	
For	visibility	purposes,	the	EU	VAT	and	the	national	VAT	could	appear	as	separate	taxes	on	the	
invoice	or	receipt	that	a	taxable	person	provides	to	his	customer.	However,	even	if	the	final	
outcome	is	not	different	from	the	existing	one,	this	could	raise	political	problems,	given	that	
taxpayers	barely	know	in	the	current	situation	they	are	paying	a	part	of	VAT	to	the	EU.	
	
But	apart	from	the	budget	financing,	the	real	issue	is	how	to	reform	the	current	working	of	EU	
VAT	 and	 to	 give	 a	 ‘double	 definitive	 solution’	 to	 VAT	 regime.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 the	 best	
solution	is	separating	the	stage	of	the	retail	from	the	previous	ones	of	the	VAT	chain.	In	the	
medium	term,	some	more	ambitious	options	could	be	envisaged,	such	as	a	‘devoted	national	
rate’	to	the	European	budget	or	a	form	of	a	European	VAT.	
                                                
40 The new European Commission’s strategy has been launched by the COM(2003)614 final (20th October). The 
most important Commission’s new guidelines are: a) “VAT is fundamentally conceived as a general consumption 
tax, with revenue going to the Member State where actually consumption takes place. […] regardless of the place 
where the taxable person carrying out the transaction is established, it is taxed at the rate applied in the Member 
State of consumption. (emph. add.); b) to shift taxation from the service’s provider place of establishment to the 
customer’s (p. 16)”. (emph. add.); c) to consider an across-the-board switch from the origin to the destination 
principle” (p. 16)” and most importantly “the Commission accepts that the developments outlined above show the 
common system of VAT moving away from a regime based on the origin principle” (18) (emph. add.); d) The 
Commission reaffirms as a long-term goal the origin regime but admit, “so long as there is no political will to 
switch to an origin-based system, any improvements to the existing common VAT system must be in line with the 
structure of the system as it exists. To ensure that the revenue goes to the Member state of consumption, 
transaction should be taxed as close as possible to the place of destination (consumer) rather than the place of 
origin (supplier). This regime still allows Member states a degree of flexibility in setting rates” (emph. add.). (p. 
18). 
41 For example, if the national VAT rate were at 16%, and the EU rate at 1%, the national rate would have to be 
reduced to 15%. The total VAT rate levied would still be 16 %. A EU rate of 1% should be enough to cover about 
half of the financing needs of the EU budget. 
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In	 the	meantime,	a	softer	and	more	practicable	solution	could	be	explored,	so	as	to	resolve	
inter-state	EU	trade	and	the	definitive	regime.	In	practical	terms,	VAT	will	work	until	the	stage	
of	retail	and	then	a	consumption	tax	would	be	levied	in	a	way	similar	to	the	RSTs	of	USA.	VAT	
taxpayers	should	apply	on	transactions	with	other	registered	VAT	taxpayers	a	single	identical	
rate	–	see	the	Box	142.	This	rate	should	be	applied	only	on	these	transactions	and	not	on	sales	
to	final	consumers.	In	practice,	this	is	equivalent	at	levying	a	VAT	until	the	stage	of	retail	and	
superimposing	on	this	stage	a	state	retail	sales	tax.	The	single	rate	on	intermediate	purchases	
would	not	mean	in	any	case	a	form	of	full	rate	unification,	given	that,	as	it	is	well	known,	the	
final	burden	of	any	consumption	tax	is	given	by	the	rate	levied	in	the	last	stage	on	final	sales.	
Therefore	this	solution	could	reduce	distortions	on	 intra-EU	trade,	 the	scope	of	 the	clearing	
mechanism,	 and	 most	 of	 all,	 to	 leave	 state	 jurisdictions	 with	 a	 remarkable	 autonomy	 in	
consumption	tax	setting.		
	
In	practical	 terms,	we	have	two	possible	options:	a)	to	put	on	 intermediate	transactions	the	
lowest	among	the	reduced	rates	–	or	an	average	of	them	–	currently	used	within	the	EU	–	let	
us	say	a	rate	included	between	6	and	10%.	A	part	of	this	rate	could	be	then	paid	directly	to	the	
EU	budget	–	1	or	2%	–	and	this	will	be	the	new	source	of	VAT	revenue;	b)	the	second	option	
will	apply	directly	a	rate	of	1-2%	on	transactions	among	VAT	taxpayers	and	in	the	same	way	as	
above,	this	amount	would	flow	to	the	EU	budget.		
	
This	 solution	 has	many	 advantages:	 first	 of	 all,	 it	 reaffirms	 the	 destination	 principle	 in	 the	
working	of	EU	VAT,	which	 is	 the	only	criterion	compatible	with	a	genuine	consumption	 tax;	
secondly,	 it	 solves	 the	old	dilemma	of	 the	definitive	 regime,	by	 leaving	states	 free	of	 taxing	
their	 consumption	 and	 to	 get	 the	 revenue;	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	of	 tax	 evasion,	 the	 new	
consumption	 tax	 can	 also	 reduce	 the	 scope	 of	 carousel	 and	 fraud	 and	 supply	 the	 right	
incentive	 to	 firms	 and	 administrations.	 In	 particular,	 instead	 of	 using	 national	 accounts	
statistics	–	which	raised	old	controversies	on	the	exact	and	real	size	of	underground	economy	
in	different	countries	–	this	solution	would	rely	on	tax	returns,	according	to	which	countries	
who	evade	will	be	penalized	by	receiving	less	revenue;	last	but	not	least,	it	can	be	a	practical	
and	efficient	way	to	finance	the	EU	budget43.			
	
The	recent	debate	on	the	best	possible	consumption	and	sales	tax	in	Europe	let	emerge	some	
other	possible	solutions	suggested	in	particular	in	the	American	discussion	on	what	might	be	
the	 best	 federal	 sales	 tax	 –	 namely,	 a	 Dual	 VAT,	 like	 those	 adopted	 in	 many	 Canadian	
provinces	and	a	compensating	Vat	which	emerged	as	a	possible	solution	in	Brazil	–	see	table	
15	for	a	discussion	of	the	different	merits	and	shortcomings	of	various	proposal44.						
		
4.3	Other	possible	sources	of	tax	revenue		
	
EU	specialists	and	academic	profession	have	largely	discussed	during	the	last	40	years	what	a	
perfect	 European	 tax	 might	 look	 like	 –	 see	 table	 16.	 In	 our	 opinion	 apart	 from	 VAT,	 that	
remains	the	best	candidate,	as	shown	also	by	the	long	experience	of	major	federal	countries,	
two	other	sources	of	revenue	for	the	EU	budget	stand	out.	The	first	would	be	the	corporate	
                                                
42 See on this Marè-Sarcinelli (1991), Marè (2003, 2006), and the proposal of ViVAT by Keen-Smith (1996), 
Keen (2000).  
43 Some forms of clearing mechanism will still be necessary, but this mechanism would be much more simplified; 
moreover, the use of national tax returns would reduce playing behaviors by taxpayers and administrations. 
44 I have discussed in detail these proposals in Marè (2006) and Marè (2014).  
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income	tax.	In	a	manner	consistent	with	the	theory	of	fiscal	federalism,	this	is	levied	at	federal	
level	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Europe	 may	 well	 do	 the	 same.	 Indeed,	 whatever	 the	 critics	 of	 tax	
harmonization	think,	a	single	corporate	income	tax	would	greatly	help	making	a	level	playing	
field	 of	 the	 internal	 market.	 Using	 this	 source	 of	 revenue	 to	 finance	 the	 EU	 budget	 has	
recently	 been	 proposed	 by	 a	 group	 of	 French	 intellectuals	 headed	 by	 Thomas	 Piketty	 (see	
“Our	Manifesto	for	Europe”,	The	Guardian,	May	2,	2014).		
	
The	 corporate	 income	 tax	 represented	 10	 percent	 of	 total	 tax	 revenue	 in	 2008	 in	 the	
Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	 (OECD).	 By	 the	 rule	 of	 thumb,	 it	
should	 thus	 be	 able	 to	 finance	 at	 least	 3	 or	 4	 times	 over	 the	 current	 EU	 budget,	 which	 is	
equivalent	to	1%	of	Europe’s	GDP.	
	
The	second	resource	we	recommend	would	be	a	single	levy	(the	existing	VAT)	on	all	(extra	EU)	
imports.	If	one	also	assumes,	in	parallel,	the	creation	of	a	single	EU	customs	organization,	then	
the	tax	collector	finally	identifies	with	the	beneficiary,	the	EU	budget	(or	shall	we	call	it	the	EU	
Treasury?).	 This	 is	 obviously	 not	 the	 case	 today:	 28	 national	 customs	 organizations	 collect	
duties	 on	 behalf	 of	 EU	 coffers	 for	 a	 fee	 (25%	 of	 the	 revenues).	 This	 reform	 would	 also	
eliminate	potential	distortions	in	the	flow	of	trade	–	and	therefore	of	duties	and	VAT	income	-	
due	 to	 the	 unequal	 application	 of	 the	 same	 customs	 code	 on	 the	 part	 of	 28	 independent	
national	agencies.	
	
Note	that	the	creation	of	an	EU	single	customs	organization	would	not	require	a	change	of	the	
EU	 Treaty,	 since	 a	 “Customs	 Union”	 is	 already	 the	 first	 “exclusive	 competence”	 of	 the	 EU,	
according	 to	 article	 3	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 its	 functioning.	 Similarly,	 giving	 to	 it	 a	 mandate	 to	
collect	not	only	duties	but	also	the	VAT	on	(extra	EU)	imports,	as	a	matter	of	tax	policy,	would	
require	unanimity,	but	again	not	a	change	of	the	Treaty.			
	
According	to	a	specific	study	on	this	subject,	the	VAT	on	(extra	EU)	imported	goods	raised	the	
equivalent	of	1.6%	of	 the	EU	GDP	 in	2006.	A	 low-growth	scenario	projection	to	2014	brings	
this	 figure	 to	 almost	 2%.45	 Thus,	 this	 source	 could	 cover	 twice	 as	much	 as	 the	 current	 EU	
budget.		
	
In	table	13	we	also	report	some	other	possible	candidates	for	a	EU	tax	usually	considered	in	
the	academic	discussion	and	European	circles.	The	energy/carbon	tax	could	be	a	good	solution	
given	 the	 spillovers	 existing	 in	 the	 environmental	 issues.	 The	 attempts	 of	 the	 last	 20	 years	
have	shown	however	many	disputes	and	controversies	on	how	to	promote	an	efficient	and	
effective	protection	of	 the	environment	and	a	strong	different	attitude	between	Nordic	and	
Southern	countries.	
	
We	are	quite	sceptics	instead	on	the	real	chance	that	a	financial	transaction	tax	may	have	to	
become	a	European	common	tax.	Since	 the	Commission’s	proposal	 in	2012,	 the	debate	has	
revealed	a	strong	resistance	by	the	financial	community,	a	lot	of	technical	and	administrative	
issues	 and	 the	 fear	 that	 this	 tax	may	 concretely	damage	 the	European	 financial	 institutions	
and	 markets	 in	 favour	 of	 those	 operating	 in	 the	 US	 and	 other	 emerging	 market	 –	 not	 to	
mention	the	tax	havens!												
	
                                                
45 See Claudia Bornico, “Studio di una nuova fonte di finanziamento nell’ambito del bilancio dell’Unione 
Europea”, Associazione Universitaria di Studi Europei, Pavia, Italy, January 2006. 
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Even	a	European	“Federation	Lite”	(see	Bonino-De	Andreis,	2011),	with	substantial	functions	
of	government	 to	carry	out	and	a	budget	of	around	5%	of	Europe’s	GDP,	could	be	 financed	
entirely	by	the	two	sources	we	mentioned,	leaving	all	the	rest	in	the	hands	of	member	states.	
	
5	Conclusions		
The	EU	budget	can	and	should	be	extensively	reformed.	The	current	EU	budget	 is	flawed	by	
many	 pitfalls	 and	 drawbacks.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 expenditure	 is	 rigid,	 the	 transfer	 of	 resources	
between	 main	 headings	 is	 not	 allowed,	 all	 expenditures	 have	 to	 be	 financed	 out	 of	 own	
resources	since	no	deficit	and	debt	 is	allowed.	But,	more	 importantly,	 from	the	point	of	the	
European	 construction,	 the	main	 problem	 is	 that	 almost	 80%	 of	 the	 budget	 resources	 are	
allocated	 to	 subsidies	 and	 transfers	 with	 a	 strong	 redistributive	 nature.	 These	 programs	
should	gradually	be	renationalized	–	mainly	in	the	domain	of	agriculture	and	social	cohesion.		
	
The	 amount	 of	 resources	 devoted	 to	 real	 genuine	 European	 public	 goods	 such	 as	 defence,	
border	 control,	 external	 affairs	 and	 security,	 R&D	 and	 so	 on	 is	 still	 very	 limited.	With	 few	
exceptions	and	 for	a	very	 limited	amount	of	 resources,	 the	current	EU	does	not	 supply	any	
kind	of	traditional	public	goods	that	other	mature	federations	usually	provide.	This	situation	
calls	for	an	urgent	plan	of	the	European	Commission	who	may	define	a	tentative	new	agenda	
and	 makes	 clear	 to	 European	 citizens	 whether	 it	 envisages	 some	 development	 in	 these	
domains	 or,	 more	 simply,	 prefers	 to	 keep	 living	 with	 the	 existent	 contradictions	 and	
ambiguities.						
	
The	same	picture	also	emerges	from	the	current	situation	of	the	own	resources.	In	the	last	30	
years,	EU	countries	have	also	decided	to	change	the	basic	nature	of	own	tax-based	resource	
financing	the	EU	budget	and	to	move	from	the	VAT	and	custom	duties,	to	a	fourth	resource,	
the	GNI-related	contribution,	which	gives	 to	 the	European	 financing	 system	 the	nature	of	a	
mechanism	suitable	for	a	club,	not	for	a	supranational	body,	where	each	individual	member	
decides	after	a	long,	damaging	bargaining,	the	amount	of	resources	(the	check	to	be	written.)	
is	 willing	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 common	 EU	 budget.	 While	 the	 European	 construction	 made	
indisputable	progress	and	achievements	during	the	last	30	years,	with	the	launch	of	the	Euro	
and	now	with	the	banking	Union,	perhaps	the	time	is	arrived	to	decide	whether	the	common	
budget	area	will	have	to	be	fundamentally	reformed,	with	the	definition	of	some	genuine	EU	
tax.	
	
At	the	beginning	of	this	paper	we	wondered	whether	this	would	be	possible.	We	may	have	in	
theory	many	answers	to	this	question,	but	we	 just	need	a	credible	one.	Of	course,	Member	
States	 could	 stick	 to	 the	 current	 arrangements	 on	 the	 expenditure	 side	 and	 base	 future	
financing	 entirely	 on	 national	 contributions.	 We	 believe	 this	 is	 not	 a	 good	 path.	 Instead,	
Member	 States	 should	 be	 ambitious	 and	 adopt	 a	 new	 budget	 structure	 and	 a	 tax-based	
financing.	As	such,	the	EU	budget	is	a	key	condition	for	the	evolution	of	European	integration	
and	also	part	of	the	debate	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	Union's	action.	Indeed,	debating	the	EU	
budget	is	actually	discussing	competing	visions	of	Europe’s	future.	
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Appendix:	Sales	taxes	in	selected	federal	countries	
	
Canada	
An	excellent	example	of	the	possible	options	and	dilemma	federal	countries	have	to	face	with	
regard	to	state	taxation	is	the	Canadian	evolution	of	the	sales	taxes:	from	two	different	sales	
taxes	to	by	and	large	a	single	form	of	consumption	tax,	namely	the	VAT.	For	a	long	time,	the	
federal	 level	 has	 been	 using	 a	 tax	 on	 the	 stage	 of	 production,	 which	 was	 levied	 on	 the	
manufacturers’	selling	price	for	domestic	goods	and	on	the	duty-paid	value	for	imports46.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	most	 Provinces	 used	 different	 kinds	 of	 sales	 taxes	 at	 the	 retail	 stage.	 This	
structure	 raised	many	 concerns	 in	 terms	 of	 efficiency,	 lack	 of	 neutrality,	 tax	 cascading	 and	
complexity,	not	 to	mention	 the	difficulties	 for	 tax	administration.	Therefore,	given	 the	clear	
advantages	the	Canadian	government	envisaged	at	that	time	in	integrating	federal	and	states	
sales	taxation	in	a	more	or	less	single	form	of	sales	taxation,	from	1997	the	entire	structure	of	
taxation	has	been	largely	revised	and	accordingly	coordinated.	In	practice,	a	jointly	operated	
national	sales	tax	was	introduced:	the	VAT	launch	at	the	federal	level	(GST,	Good	and	Service	
Tax)	as	well	as	 in	many	provinces	has	solved	and	simplified	the	previous	complex	structure:	
“the	 tax	have	a	common	base,	a	 common	 federal	 tax	 rate	and	variable	provincial	 tax	 rates.	
There	are	however	some	major	issue	still	arising	such	as	how	to	account	for	the	tax	on	inter-
provincial	sales	if	goods	and	services	are	to	be	taxed	according	to	the	destination	principle”	47.	
It	is	not	surprising	therefore	that	the	idea	of	having	a	common	federal	tax	working	jointly	with	
several	states	retail	sales	taxes	has	been	for	many	years	at	the	core	of	the	debate.						
In	Table	8,	we	explain	in	some	detail	the	rather	differentiated	Canadian	situation.	The	menu	of	
consumption	taxes	used	in	this	country	is	very	rich	and	broad;	Canada	is	the	ideal	laboratory	
for	 any	 study	 on	 the	 coordination	 of	 separate	 and	 different	 taxes	 on	 consumption	 across	
different	levels	of	government.	Moreover,	the	solutions	adopted	in	the	Canadian	experience	
may	be	 very	useful	 for	 the	 future	 reforming	path	of	 the	European	Union	and	other	 federal	
countries.		
Alberta	2)	 is	the	only	province	to	use	a	single	federal	VAT48,	with	no	consumption	tax	at	the	
provincial	 level,	while	 in	Quebec	3)	 to	 the	 federal	VAT	 (GST)	 is	associated	 the	Quebec	Sales	
Tax	–	 a	 special	 form	of	VAT.	 The	base	 for	 the	 taxes	of	 the	 two	 levels	of	 government	 is	 the	
same,	even	 if	 some	special	 rules	 sometimes	apply	 for	provinces.	 It	 is	 important	 to	highlight	
that	the	province	of	Quebec	administrates	both	taxes	and	applies	the	provincial	tax	on	a	base	
inclusive	of	the	federal	GST.	This	is	a	positive	element	for	the	VAT	robustness	with	respect	to	
evasion	and	administration	even	if	some	cascading	inevitably	occurs.	The	joint	administration	
is	however	on	the	whole	quite	positive:	in	fact,	some	economies	of	scale	may	emerge	for	the	
federal	level	given	the	strong	incentive	Quebec	has	in	checking	both	bases	and	taxes.			
In	 the	 first	 group	 1)	 of	 five	 provinces	 (British	 Columbia,	 Newfoundland,	 Nova	 Scotia,	 New	
Brunswick,	 Ontario)	 the	 two-tiers	 VATs	 are	 completely	 harmonized	 and	 managed	 at	 the	
federal	 level	 in	a	single	tax	(VAT)	called	the	Harmonized	Sales	Tax	(HST).	The	revenue	of	the	
provincial	 share	 of	 the	 HST	 is	 then	 assigned	 to	 the	 provinces.	 In	 the	 group	 4)	 of	 three		
provinces	 (Saskatchewan,	Manitoba	 and	 Prince	 Edward	 Island)	 the	 federal	 tax	 (the	 GST)	 is	
                                                
46  See on previous Canadian sales taxes, Poddar (1988). 
47  Cnossen (1988, p. 392, emph. add.). 
48  The Canadian VAT is named Good and Service Tax (GST).  
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used	 jointly	with	 a	 provincial	 sales	 tax	 (Pst)	which	 is	 a	 RST,	 even	 if	 between	 the	 provinces	
there	are	many	 important	differences	 in	 the	practical	enforcement,	application,	exemptions	
and	base	coverage.		
In	 Table	 9	we	 illustrate	 the	 Canadian	 rates	 for	 the	 various	 combinations	 of	GSTs,	HSTs	 and	
RSTs	and	which	level	of	government	is	responsible	for	the	tax	administration.	The	general	rate	
of	 the	 federal	GST	 is	 5%.	 In	 the	 case	of	British	Columbia,	Newfoundland,	Nova	 Scotia,	New	
Brunswick	and	Ontario	we	have	a	unique	tax	for	the	two	levels,	the	HST	that	applies	5%	for	
the	national	level	and	from	7	to	10%	for	the	provincial	one.	Quebec	couples	the	federal	GST	of	
5%	with	a	provincial	VAT,	the	Quebec	Sales	Tax,	which	applies	a	rate	of	7.5%.	The	province	of	
Quebec	 administers	 both	 taxes.	 Other	 3	 provinces,	 Saskatchewan,	 Manitoba	 and	 Prince	
Edward	Island	make	use	of	the	GST	and	of	different	RSTs	with	the	rate	of	5%	in	Saskatchewan,	
7%		in	Manitoba	and	10%	in	Prince	Edward	Island.	Finally,	Alberta	has	no	provincial	sales	tax.					
United	States	
In	table	10	we	give	a	full	account	of	rates	for	sales	taxes	and	excises	in	all	51	American	states	
as	of	January	1,	201149.	The	sales	rates	vary	from	the	lowest	2.9	per	cent	of	Colorado	to	the	
highest	 rates	 of	 8.25	 per	 cent	 of	 California.	 Five	 states	 do	 not	 levy	 any	 rate	 on	 sales	 to	
consumers,	such	as	Alaska,	Delaware,	Montana,	New	Hampshire	and	Oregon.	Florida	shows	a	
rate	 of	 6.0	 per	 cent,	 Arizona	 6.60%,	 Massachusetts	 6.25%,	 Minnesota	 6.875%,	 Indiana,	
Mississippi,	New	Jersey,	Rhode	Island	and	Tennessee	7.0%,	Pennsylvania	6.0%,	Texas	6.25%,	
Washington	6.50%.		
In	table	11	we	provide	other	useful	information	on	the	role	and	economic	weight	of	the	retail	
sales	 taxes	 in	 states	 revenue	 financing	 and	US	 fiscal	 federalism.	We	 see	 that	 the	 economic	
significance	 of	 the	 RSTs	 –	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 the	 sales	 taxes	 per	 capita	 –	 are	 much	
differentiated	across	the	states.	Excluding	the	states	where	no	taxes	are	levied,	rates	fluctuate	
from	the	lowest	level	of	Vermont	and	Virginia,	which	rank	as	45th	and	44th,	with	555	and	611	
dollars	per	capita,	to	the	highest	of	Wyoming	(2,303	dollars),	Washington	(2,108)	and	Hawaii	
(2,043	dollars).	The	average	of	sales	taxes	for	all	states	is	equal	to	1,005	dollars	per	capita.	The	
figures	show	a	very	significant	economic	role	of	the	Retail	Sales	Taxes	in	the	annual	budget	of	
the	households,	as	well	as	in	the	structure	of	revenue	financing	of	the	various	states.		
To	show	this	latter	aspect,	in	column	5	the	relative	weight	of	the	sales	taxes	as	a	percentage	of	
total	 state	 taxes	 has	 been	 accounted	 for.	 Sales	 taxes	 account	 for	 around	 half	 of	 the	 total	
revenue	of	Hawaii	 (47.9%),	 for	a	percentage	higher	than	60	per	cent	of	the	total	revenue	in	
Tennessee	 (60.6)	 and	 Washington	 (61.2).	 Florida	 (55.9%)	 and	 South	 Dakota	 (57.5%)	 show	
percentages	bigger	 than	50%.	At	 the	 lowest	 level,	we	 find	Vermont	and	Virginia	with	13.5%	
and	 19.0%	 respectively.	 The	 sales	 taxes	 represent,	 in	 average,	 approximately	 one	 third	
(32.1%)	of	the	total	states	taxes	revenue.		
During	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 there	 has	 been	 an	 intense	 debate	 in	 the	US	 on	 the	 possible	
advantages	of	moving	to	a	federal	sales	tax,	both	in	the	form	of	a	federal	RST	or	even	better	
as	a	VAT.	Most	of	the	academic	experts	have	advocated	the	case	for	a	VAT	in	the	European	
style,	also	considering	 the	positive	experience	of	 the	Canadian	 federation50	and	 the	 relative	
superiority	of	VAT	in	taxing	all	sales	and	exempting	business	inputs.	The	introduction	in	the	US	
of	a	 federal	 sales	 tax	 is	made	difficult,	 	however,	by	 the	 facts	 that	many	 local	governments	
                                                
49   See for a general evaluation of the RSTs, Mikesell (1997). 
50  See on this Bird (1999), McLure (2005), Hellerstein (2005), Keen (2007).  
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levy	various	forms	of	taxes	on	the	base	of	consumption	and	that	the	states	are	very	jealous	of	
their	tax	autonomy	in	taxing	consumption	and	setting	the	rates.	A	classic	dual	system,	such	as	
the	one	existing	 in	Canada,	 India	and	Brazil	would	be	problematic	given	 that	 some	genuine	
forms	of	vertical	coordination	with	 local	consumption	taxes	should	 in	the	end	be	envisaged.	
The	move	toward	a	dual	VAT-consumption	tax	system	would	have	to	overcome	the	prejudices	
of	American	 states	on	 the	possible	 risk	 that	 this	dual	 approach	may	 limit	 and	 restrain	 their	
autonomy,	as	a	consequence	of	the	introduction	of	a	federal	tax.	Last	but	not	least,	there	is	
the	 old	 and	 well-known	 argument	 of	 the	 VAT	 as	 a	 money	 machine,	 therefore	 causing	 a	
considerable	increase	in	the	size	of	the	federal	government51.						
India		
Another	 important	 example	 in	 taxing	 consumption	 at	 the	 federal	 and	 state	 level	 Is	 India,	
where	a	 long	 tradition	 in	 coordinating	 consumption	 taxes	 at	different	 levels	of	 government	
exists.	On	1st	April	2005,	India	decided	to	adopt	VAT	at	the	central	and	state	level,	even	if	this	
tax	 is	quite	different	from	the	current,	 ideal	VAT	used	in	Europe,	Canada	and	in	many	other	
countries.	In	its	essence,	the	Indian	VAT	is	a	tax	only	on	the	manufacturing	sector	and	imports	
and	excludes	a	large	part	of	final	sales	to	consumers.	VATs	are	applied	on	an	origin-base,	not	
destination.	Only	20	states,	out	of	28,	have	however	adopted	state	VATs,	while	the	remaining	
states	have	decided	to	stick	to	the	traditional	RSTs	and	the	situation	is	still	evolving.	
Sales	 tax	can	be	 levied	either	by	the	Central	or	State	Government.	From	June	2008,	a	2	per	
cent	tax	(from	4%)	 is	generally	 levied	on	all	 inter-State	sales.	State	sales	taxes	that	apply	on	
sales	made	within	a	State,	have	rates	that	range	from	4	to	15	per	cent.	Exports	and	services	
are	exempt	from	sales	tax.	Sales	tax	is	levied	on	the	seller	who	recovers	it	from	the	customer	
at	 the	time	of	sale.	Sales	Tax	 in	 India	are	 imposed	under	Central	Government	(Central	Sales	
Tax)	and	the	State	Government	(Sales	Tax)	Legislation.	Normally,	each	state	has	its	own	sales	
tax	act	and	levies	the	tax	at	various	rates.	However,	most	of	the	states	in	India,	from	April	01,	
2005,	 have	 supplemented	 the	 sales	 tax	with	 the	 new	Value	 Added	 Tax	 (VAT).	 VAT	 rates	 in	
India	 are	 the	 following:	 0%	 for	 the	 essential	 commodities;	 1%	 on	 gold	 ingots	 as	 well	 as	
expensive	 stones;	 4%	 on	 capital	 merchandise,	 industrial	 inputs,	 and	 commodities	 of	 mass	
consumption;	12.5%	on	all	other	items.	Variable	rates	(depending	on	state)	are	applicable	for	
tobacco,	liquor,	petroleum	products,	etc.	A	Central	Sales	Tax	of	4%	is	also	levied	on	inter-State	
sales	 but	 this	 tax	 should	 be	 eliminated	 gradually	 if	 a	 fully	 neutral	 VAT	 has	 to	 be	 finally	
adopted.	
	
The	 major	 problem	 in	 India,	 as	 in	 other	 federal	 experiences,	 is	 how	 to	 tax	 and	 treat	 the	
interstate	 trade	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 a	 neutral	 solution	 and	 achieve	 a	 true	 internal	market	 for	
goods	and	services.	The	fact	that	“no	tax	credit	will	be	allowed	for	inter-state	trade	seriously	
undermines	 the	 basic	 benefit	 of	 enforcing	 a	 VAT	 system,	 namely	 the	 removal	 of	 the	
distortions	 in	movement	of	goods	across	 the	 states52”.	Moreover,	 there	are	also	a	 series	of	
indirect	 taxes	 at	 the	 central	 and	 state	 levels	 that	 need	 to	 be	 integrated	 into	 a	 fully	
comprehensive,	neutral	sales	tax.	Perhaps	the	major	barrier	to	inter-state	trade	is	the	Central	
Sales	 Tax	 levied	 by	 the	 central	 government	 and	 a	 satisfactory	 solution	 should	 envisage	 its	
phasing	out.	When	this	process	will	be	completed,	controls	could	be	abolished	on	nearly	all	
state	borders.	The	government	is	committed	to	the	introduction	of	a	nation-wide	goods	and	
                                                
51 See Keen-Lockwood (2007). 
52 See Sharma (2004). 
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services	tax	that	would	meet	these	objectives,	but	 its	final	form	has	yet	to	be	determined53.	
Unfortunately,	the	elimination	of	the	Central	sales	tax	(CST)	has	been	still	deferred	even	if	a	
dual	GST	is	expected	to	replace	the	current	taxes.	CST	is	levied	on	basis	of	origin	and	collected	
by	the	exporting	state;	the	consumers	of	the	 importing	state	bear	 its	 incidence.	CST	creates	
tax	 barriers	 to	 integrate	 the	 Indian	 market	 and	 leads	 to	 cascading	 impact	 on	 cost	 of	
production.	Further,	the	denial	of	input	tax	credit	on	inter-state	sales	and	inter	state	transfers	
would	affect	free	flow	of	goods."	(Sharma,	2004).	
	
Brazil		
The	 long	 tradition	 of	 Brazil	 in	 taxing	 consumption	 at	 the	 state	 level	 has	 not	 allowed	 this	
country	to	work	out	the	issues	of	tax	coordination	in	taxing	consumption54.	The	federal	tax	in	
Brazil	 (‘IPI’	–	 imposto	 sobre	productos	 industrializados)	 is	not	a	 comprehensive	VAT	–	 it	 is	a	
single	 stage	 tax	 –	 and	 is	 essentially	 limited	 to	 the	manufacturing	 sector/goods	 and	 imports	
and	operates	with	many	rates	and	exemptions	–	ie,	exports	are	exempt.	The	national	VAT	(IPI)	
rates	depend	on	the	type	of	the	product	at	an	average	rate	of	20%.	The	federal	tax	resembles	
to	VAT	since	it	provides	some	credit	for	the	input	taxes.	The	IPI	revenue	is	then	assigned	back	
to	 the	states	according	some	revenue-sharing	 formula.	The	 tax	 is	 largely	 imperfect	not	only	
for	its	limited	tax	base	and	coverage	but	for	the	imperfect	shifting	to	the	final	consumption,	as	
it	should	be	for	any	general	consumption	tax.								
At	 the	 state	 level	 Brazil	 uses	 a	 fully	 VAT	 (the	 ‘ICMS’	 –	 imposto	 sobre	 operacoes	 relatives	 a	
circulacao	 de	 mercadorias	 e	 servicios)	 which	 applies	 the	 origin	 principle,	 not	 that	 of	
destination	–	revenue	accrues	to	the	state	where	the	good	or	service	is	produced	–	and	uses	
the	invoice-credit	mechanism.	This	makes	the	working	of	the	state	VAT,	and	more	generally	of	
the	‘Dual	VAT’,	largely	imperfect	and	cumbersome.	The	origin	principle	brings	the	well	known	
problems	of	the	redistribution	of	the	tax	revenue	accrued	to	the	states	where	the	goods	are	
produced	–	the	clearing	mechanism	already	proposed	in	the	‘80s	by	the	EC	in	the	EU	–	as	well	
as	 the	 imbalances	 following	 from	 trade	 surplus	 and	 deficit	 among	 the	 states.	 Some	 reduce	
rates	are	applied	on	the	interstate	trade	with	poorer	states.	At	the	same	time	this	VAT	tends	
to	 exclude	 several	 services	 and	 although	 is	 extended	 through	 the	 retail	 stage,	 there	 is	 still	
some	imperfect	shifting	of	the	tax	and	cascading.		
The	state	VAT	(ICMS)	is	charged	at	rates	ranging	from	7%	to	25%.	Intrastate	transactions	are	
taxed	at	18%,	interstate	transactions	are	taxed	at	7%	and	12%,	and	most	imports	are	taxed	at	
between	18%	and	25%.	Communication	services	are	taxed	at	between	13%	and	25%	55.	Basic	
necessities	are	exempt	and	zero-rated	or	taxed	at	7%.	The	rate	on	the	industrial	sector	is	12-
18%,	that	on	utilities	and	oil/fuels	25%,	while	on	luxury	and	excisable	goods	is	30-35%56.	The	
states	 can	 set	 their	 internal	 VAT	 rates	 and	 usually	 these	 vary	 a	 lot	 on	 different	 items	 and	
goods57.	Generally	the	municipalities	then	tax	services	that	are	exempt	from	the	state	VAT.58	
                                                
53  See OECD Economic Survey on India, 2007.  
54  Bird-Gendron (2000) wrote that “the first country to introduce a full-fledged VAT was not France (which has 
indeed pioneered with this form of taxation but did not initially carry it through the retail stage). Perhaps 
surprisingly, that country was Brazil”.      
55  See for a discussion on Brazilian states VAT rates and exemptions, de Mello (2007).  
56    See Jimenez (2010).  
57  See for an evaluation of the Brazilian VATs, Varsano (1999), Bird (1999), Bird-Gendron (2000), Ebrill et al. 
(2001), Bird-Mintz-Wilson (2006), de Mello (2007). For a discussion of the fiscal federalism in Brazil see 
Mora-Varsano (2001).  For recent data see Jimenez (2010). 
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On	the	whole,	the	Brazilian	experience	with	VAT	is	very	interesting	but	the	balance	is	still	not	
satisfactorily.	 As	 stated	 by	 Bird	 and	 Gendron	 (2001,	 19)	 “at	 present	 in	 Brazil	 the	 origin	
principle	 applies	 with	 respect	 to	 interstate	 trade.	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 no	 meaningful	
conceptual	or	administrative	 integration	between	the	federal	and	state	versions	of	the	VAT.	
Brazil	 in	a	 sense	 thus	has	 the	worst	of	 both	worlds	 (emph.	 add.).	 It	 has	 all	 the	problems	of	
dealing	with	cross-border	trade	that	have,	for	example,	bedevilled	the	EU.	In	addition,	it	also	
has	 excessive	 compliance	 and	 administrative	 costs,	 tax	 exporting	 and	 tax	 competition	 –	
problems	that	are	often	alleged	to	be	inevitable	by	products	of	such	“dual”	VAT	systems.”59	–	
which	has	determined	a	tax	war	between	the	Brazilian	states;	finally	the	different	rates	have	
produced	serious	economic	distortions	and	a	considerable	tax	evasion.																
Argentina	
Argentina	has	reformed	the	structure	of	sales	taxation	only	during	the	 ‘90,	perhaps	 learning	
the	lesson	from	Brazil.	Argentina	has	a	quite	satisfactory	federal	VAT	which	applies	a	rate	of	
20	per	cent,	while	the	provinces	use	a	very	 limited	form	of	VAT	–	essentially	a	turnover	tax,	
the	provincial	gross	receipt	taxes,	which	are	no	destination-based.	This	turnover	tax	is	levied	
with	many	rates	on	various	business	and	activities60.		
There	has	been	a	long	debate	on	which	solution	would	prove	to	be	the	best	to	reform	the	two	
levels	 sales	 tax	 system:	a	 single	provincial	VAT,	 a	provincial	RST	or	 a	dual	VAT	 system	as	 in	
Canada,	 where	 the	 latter	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 preferred	 solution.	 The	 adoption	 of	 an	 ideal	
destination-based	VAT	is	however	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	transfer	process	tied	to	the	
clearing	 mechanism	 would	 inevitably	 involve	 significant	 transfer	 of	 tax	 revenue	 from	 the	
richest	provinces	(for	example,	Buenos	Aires)	to	the	less	well-off.	
	
                                                                                                                                                            
58 “There is a wide dispersion of rates levied on intra-state transactions, and a systematic compilation of ICMS 
legislation is not available. Intra-state rates are required to be set in principle within a range determined by the 
Senate, with a minimum rate of 12%. Basic necessities are typically exempt, zero-rated (which generates a 
credit) or taxed at 7%. Because several states use the ICMS as an industrial policy instrument, many sectors are 
taxed in the 12%-18% range, such as the motor industry, while utilities and oil/fuels are taxed at 25%. The 
ICMS collected in these sectors accounted for about 40% of total ICMS revenue in 2001, up from nearly 27% 
in 1997. Luxury goods, as well as typical excisables, such as tobacco and beverages, tend to be taxed at a 
higher rate of 30-35%. The states with fiscal consolidation needs often levy this higher rate on price-inelastic 
goods and utilities as a means of raising revenue. […] As in the case of the federal indirect taxes, many states 
collect the ICMS at the production, rather than the retail, stage on the basis of the estimated tax liability for an 
average production chain in different sectors. Liabilities are calculated on a tax-inclusive basis. The ICMS is 
collected on an origin basis, so that revenue accrues to the state where the good/service is produced. Poorer 
states, typically net importers of ICMS-liable goods and services, have therefore called for shifting collection 
to the destination, which would result in a redistribution of the ICMS tax take in their favour. A compromise 
has been reached by applying different rates on inter-state trade. Accordingly, trade between a rich state (i.e., 
those states located in the South, South-East and Centre-West) and a poor state (i.e., those located in the North 
and Northeast, as well as the state of Espírito Santo) is taxed at 7%; otherwise, interstate trade is taxed at 12%, 
the lowest rate applicable in principle to intra-state trade in any state. Registered traders in an importing state 
are allowed to credit their taxes paid on inter-state imports against their ICMS liabilities in the importing state” 
de Mello (2007, 7). 
59   Along the same line Varsano (1999, 9) wrote “IPI and ICMS are partial taxes, the former on manufactured 
goods only and the later on all merchandises but not on services in general. They are highly selective taxes, 
many distinct rates applying to different goods; and, in the case of the ICMS, the rate concerning any particular 
good varies among states while interstate transactions are subject to one out of two yet different rates, set by 
the Federal Senate.”.        
60   See Bird-Gendron (2000), Rezk (2000), Bird-Mintz-Wilson (2006). 
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Table 1: EU budget revenue 1970-2010 (% GNI) 
 
 1970 1979 1988 1995 2004 2010 
 EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15 EU-25 EU-27 
VAT-based own resource (1) --- 0,38 0,59 0,58 0,13 0,10 
GNP/GNI-based own resource (2) --- --- 0,10 0,21 0,65 0,75 
Other payments from/to Member States (3) 0,78 --- --- --- --- --- 
Total national contributions (4)=(1)+(2)+(3) 0,78 0,38 0,68 0,80 0,78 0,85 
Traditional own resources (5) --- 0,39 0,28 0,22 0,12 0,13 
Total own resources (6)=(4)+(5) 0,78 0,77 0,96 1,01 0,90 0,97 
Surplus from previous year (7) --- 0,00 0,01 0,10 0,05 0,02 
Other revenue (8) 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05 
TOTAL REVENUE (9)=(6)+(7)+(8) 0,78 0,78 0,99 1,12 0,98 1,05 
 
1.3. Situation today 
 
There are now three main categories of own resource: traditional own resources, the VAT-
based resource and the GNI-based resource. These are supplemented by various correction 
mechanisms7: 
 
̛ The first own resource ("traditional own resource" or TOR) mainly consists of customs 
duties and some resources of agricultural origin (sugar levies). Since 2001, a 25 % flat-
rate deduction is retained at source by the Member States by way of collection costs. 
Before that, the percentage retained was 10%. TOR represents 14.1 % of the total EU 
revenues in the 2011 budget8 (see Table 2). 
 
̛ The second resource results from the application of a uniform rate to Member States’ 
value added tax (VAT) bases. The uniform rate is set at 0.30%. However, this percentage 
has been reduced for 4 Member States (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) 
for the period 2007-2013 only. Where a Member State's VAT base is greater than 50 % of 
its GNI the uniform rate is applied to a base equivalent to 50% of GNI (capping). Six 
Member States (Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia) are expected 
to have their VAT base capped in 2011. The VAT-based own resource represents 11.2 % 
of revenue in the budget 2011. 
 
̛ The third resource, the "additional" resource, results from the application of a uniform rate 
to Member States’ GNI bases; calculated in such a way as to cover the balance of total 
expenditure not covered by the other resources. Gross annual reductions in GNI payments 
are granted to Sweden and the Netherlands for 2007-2013 only. The GNI-based own 
resource represents 70.0% of revenue in the budget 2011. 
                                                 
7 The EU financing system has been modified with the entry into force on 1.3.2009 of the Own Resources 
Decision 2007 (2007/436/EC, Euratom - OJ L 163 of 23.6.2007). 
8 Amending budget 4/2011. 
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0.3 percent. In the context of financing the “UK rebate”, some net
contributors have been granted for the period 2007 to 2013 only a
reduction of the call rate (Germany 0.15 percent, Sweden and the
Netherlands 0.1 percent, Austria 0.225 percent). The GNI-based
own resource exists since 1988. As a residual financing source they
serve to balance the budget subject to the own resources ceiling; as
a consequence, the call rates (which are identical for all member
states) are updated each year. Both the kind and the scope of the
generation of own resources as well as the taking over of own tasks
by the EU have to be voted by unanimity by the European Council
and by all member states according to their respective constitu-
tional provisions. The current EU expenditure ceiling, which is
equal to the revenue ceiling, is set at 1.29 percent of aggregate EU
GNI (commitment appropriations) and 1.23 percent (payment
appropriations), respectively. In practice, this ceiling is never
reached. As a rule, actual payments by member states fall markedly
below the ceiling: In 2010, for example, they amounted to
0.97 percent of GNI; in the second half of last decade they fluctu-
ated around 0.9 percent of GNI.
Since the end of the 1970s a remarkable structural shift can be
observed for the composition of the EU’s own resources (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Composition of EU revenues from own resources
Source: European Commission, 2012.
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Table	2	
Eu	budget:	Type	of	revenue		
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M U L T I A N N U A L  F I N A N C I A L  F R A M E W O R K  2 0 1 4 - 2 0 2 0  A N D  E U  B U D G E T  2 0 1 4  ● T H E  F I G U R E S
Breakdown by type of revenue
Type of revenue (1)
EU budget 2013 EU budget 2014
EUR million (²) % EUR million (²) %
Customs duties and sugar levies 14 822.7 10.3 16 310.7 12.0
VAT-based resource 14 680.1 10.2 17 882.2 13.2
GNI-based resource 110 822.8 76.7 99 767.3 73.6
Other revenue 4 125.2 2.9 1 544.4 1.1
TOTAL 144 450.8 100.0 135 504.6 100.0
(1) The figures for 2013 are those corresponding to the AB no 9/2013
(2) Rounded figures
Customs duties  
and sugar levies GNI-based resource VAT-based resource Other revenue
EU budget 2013 EU budget 2014
EUR million
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Table	3	
Multiannual	Financial	Framework	2014-2020	(in	current	prices)	
	
	
	
Commitment appropriations 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total2014–2020
1 Smart and inclusive growth 63 973 66 813 69 304 72 342 75 271 78 752 82 466 508 921
1a Competitiveness for growth and jobs 16 560 17 666 18 467 19 925 21 239 23 082 25 191 142 130
1b Economic, social and territorial cohesion 47 413 49 147 50 837 52 417 54 032 55 670 57 275 366 791
2 Sustainable growth: natural resources 59 303 59 599 59 909 60 191 60 267 60 344 60 421 420 034
Of which: market related expenditure and 
direct payments 44 130 44 368 44 628 44 863 44 889 44 916 44 941 312 735
3 Security and citizenship 2 179 2 246 2 378 2 514 2 656 2 801 2 951 17 725
4 Global Europe 8 335 8 749 9 143 9 432 9 825 10 268 10 510 66 262
5 Administration 8 721 9 076 9 483 9 918 10 346 10 786 11 254 69 584
Of which: administrative expenditure of the 
institutions 7 056 7 351 7 679 8 007 8 360 8 700 9 071 56 224
6 Compensations 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 29
Total commitment appropriations 142 540 146 483 150 217 154 397 158 365 162 951 167 602 1 082 555
As a percentage of GNI 1.03 % 1.02 % 1.00 % 1.00 % 0.99 % 0.98 % 0.98 % 1.00 %
Total payment appropriations 135 866 141 901 144 685 142 771 149 074 153 362 156 295 1 023 954
as a percentage of GNI 0.98 % 0.98 % 0.97 % 0.92 % 0.93 % 0.93 % 0.91 % 0.95 %
Margin available 0.25 % 0.25 % 0.26 % 0.31 % 0.30 % 0.30 % 0.32 % 0.28 %
Own Resources Ceiling as a percentage of GNI 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 % 1.23 %
8 
M U L T I A N N U A L  F I N A N C I A L  F R A M E W O R K  2 0 1 4 - 2 0 2 0  A N D  E U  B U D G E T  2 0 1 4  ● T H E  F I G U R E S
Multiannual financial framework 2014–2020 
in current prices
(EUR million —  
current prices)
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	 	 	 Table	4	 	 	
	 	 Public	expenditures	as	%	of	GDP	(year	2010)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
EU-27	 	 	 	 		50.6	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Germany	 	 	 	 		47.9	 	
France	 	 	 	 		56.6	 	
Italy	 	 	 	 		50.3	 	
Poland	 	 	 	 		45.4	 	
Spain	 	 	 	 		45.6	 	
UK	 	 	 	 		50.4	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
United	States	 	 	 		42.3	 	
Japan	 	 	 	 		40.7	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Sources:	Eurostat	for	EU	and	EU	member	states;	OECD	for	the	U.S.	and	Japan.	
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Table 5  
Vertical Co-ordination in Taxing Consumption 
   STATES  
  VAT RST No 
Taxation 
 VAT 1 2 3 
  Dual 
VAT 
VAT + 
RST 
Federal 
VAT 
     
FEDERATION RST 4 5 6 
  RST + 
VAT 
RST + 
RST 
Federal 
RST 
     
 No 7 8 9 
 Taxation State 
VAT 
State 
RST 
No tax 
 
 
Table 6  Vertical Coordination in Taxing Consumption1 
   STATES  
  VAT RST No 
Taxation 
 VAT Canada Canada Germany 
  India2 India2 Austria 
  Brazil3  Switzerland 
  Argentina4  Belgium 
FEDERATION RST   Australia 
     
 No 
taxatio
n 
EU USA  
     
1.  See for a general discussion of the different experiences par. 2.2. 
2.  India decided to introduce in 2006 states VATs even if these VATs use an origin based system rather than a 
destination one. Federal VAT however is essentially limited to the manufacturing sector and imports. Only 21 States 
have adopted state VAT’s while the remaining still stick to the original RSTs. 
3.  The federal tax in Brazil is not a comprehensive VAT and is essentially limited to the manufacturing sector 
and imports and operates with many rates and exemptions. 
4. Argentina has a typical federal VAT, while VATs used by provinces are essentially turnover taxes and not 
destination-based. 
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Table	7	
 
Table	10
Sales	Taxes	in	Federal	Countries
Federal	VAT State	Sales	Taxes Type	of	
Country	 (VAT	+	RST) State	taxAustralia yes no all	VAT	revenuegoes	to	statesCanada yes yes VATs	+	RSTsUnited	States no yes RSTs	(5	states	no	tax)Argentina yes yes gross	receipts	taxesBrazil yes/no	 yes VAT	(origin	base)(turnover	tax)India no yes VATGermany	 yes no state	share	inVAT	revenueAustria yes no state	share	inVAT	revenue	Belgium yes no state	share	inVAT	revenue	Switzerland yes no noneEuropean	Union no
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Table	8		
	Consumption	Taxation	in	Canada	
	
Provinces	 Federal	level	 Provincial	
level	
Types	of	taxes	 Sub-national	rate	
setting	
autonomy	
1)	British	Columbia,		
Newfoundland,	Nova	
Scotia,	New	Brunswick,	
Ontario	
HST	 HST	 									VAT	 No	
	
2)	Alberta	
	
GST	
													_	
	
										
									VAT	
no,	there	is	no	
provincial	tax	in	
place		
3)	Quebec	 GST	 QST	 				VAT	+	VAT	 Yes	
	
4)	Saskatchewan,	
Manitoba,	Prince	Edward	
Island	
GST	 							RST	(Pst)	 				VAT	+	RST	 Yes	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
The	 order	 is	 from	 the	most	 harmonized	 to	 the	 least	 harmonized.	 For	 provinces	 1)	 the	 revenue	 of	 the	
provincial	 share	 of	 the	 HSTs	 is	 assigned	 to	 these	 provinces,	 while	 for	 provinces	 3	 and	 4	 federal	 VAT	
revenue	is	not	allocated	to	them.		Alberta	(2)	is	the	only	province	without	a	sales	tax.	Quebec	applies	VAT	
as	a	provincial	sales	tax	named	Quebec	Sales	Tax	(QST).	
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Table 9 
Consumption Tax Rates and Tax Administration in Canada 
 
Table	7	Consumption	Tax	Rates	and	Tax	Administration	in	Canada
Central	Government	+	Provinces Federal	Level Provincial	Level AdministrationCanada 5% Federal	except	in	Quebec1)	British	Columbia HST	5	% HST	7% Provincial				Newfoundland,	 HST	5% HST	8% Provincial				Nova	Scotia																																																																																																										HST 5% HST	10% Provincial				New	Brunswick	 HST5% HST	8% Provincial				Ontario HST	5% HST	8% Provincial2)	Alberta GST	5	% No	sales	tax Federal3)	Quebec GST	5	% QST	(VAT)	7.5	% Provincial					 	4)	Prince	Edward	Island	 GST	5	% RST	(Pst)	10	% Provincial						Saskatchewan GST	5	% RST	(Pst)			5% Provincial						Manitoba GST	5	% RST	(Pst)			7% Provincial
In Prince Edw ard Island the PST is applied to retail sales prices including GST.
In Quebec the QST is applied to GST base including GST.
In Manitoba and Saskatchew an the PST is applied to the retail level.
There is a proposed increased in Quebec of the QST from 7.5% to 8.5  
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Tavola 10 
State
State Tax 
Rate Rank
Avg. Local 
Tax Rate 
(a)
Combined 
Rate Rank
Ala. 4.00% 38 4.03% 8.03% 10
Alaska None 46 1.12% 1.12% 46
Ariz. 6.60% 9 2.41% 9.01% 3
Ark. 6.00% 15 2.10% 8.10% 9
Calif. (b)(d) 8.25% 1 0.83% 9.08% 2
Colo. 2.90% 45 4.08% 6.98% 24
Conn. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
Del. None 46 None None 47
Fla. 6.00% 15 0.99% 6.99% 23
Ga. 4.00% 38 2.95% 6.95% 25
Hawaii (c) 4.00% 38 0.35% 4.35% 45
Idaho 6.00% 15 0.03% 6.03% 32
Ill. 6.25% 12 1.97% 8.22% 8
Ind. 7.00% 2 None 7.00% 19
Iowa 6.00% 15 0.84% 6.84% 26
Kans. 6.30% 11 1.65% 7.95% 12
Ky. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
La. 4.00% 38 4.69% 8.69% 4
Maine 5.00% 32 None 5.00% 43
Md. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
Mass. 6.25% 12 None 6.25% 31
Mich. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
Minn. 6.875% 7 0.27% 7.14% 17
Miss. 7.00% 2 None 7.00% 19
Mo. 4.225% 37 3.24% 7.46% 15
Mont. (e) None 46 None None 47
Nebr. 5.50% 29 0.89% 6.39% 29
Nev. 6.85% 8 1.11% 7.96% 11
N.H. None 46 None None 47
N.J. 7.00% 2 None 7.00% 19
N.M. (c) 5.125% 31 2.01% 7.14% 18
N.Y. 4.00% 38 4.52% 8.52% 6
N.C. 5.75% 28 2.07% 7.82% 13
N.D. 5.00% 32 0.57% 5.57% 39
Ohio 5.50% 29 1.28% 6.78% 27
Okla. 4.50% 36 3.83% 8.33% 7
Ore. None 46 None None 47
Pa. 6.00% 15 0.34% 6.34% 30
R.I. 7.00% 2 None 7.00% 19
S.C. 6.00% 15 1.25% 7.25% 16
S.D. 4.00% 38 1.22% 5.22% 42
Tenn. 7.00% 2 2.44% 9.44% 1
Tex. 6.25% 12 1.36% 7.61% 14
Utah (b) 5.95% 27 0.67% 6.62% 28
Vt. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
Va. (b) 5.00% 32 None 5.00% 43
Wash. 6.50% 10 2.14% 8.64% 5
W.Va. 6.00% 15 None 6.00% 33
Wis. 5.00% 32 0.42% 5.42% 40
Wyo. 4.00% 38 1.30% 5.30% 41
DC 6.00% - – 6.00% –
State and Local Sales Tax Rates
As of January 1, 2011
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Tavola 11 
State Sales Tax 
Collections* 
($ thousands) 
Sales Tax Per capita Per capita rank Sales Taxes as a % 
of Total State Taxes 
Alabama 2 221 506 483 43 26.0% 
Alaska 0 0 - 0.0% 
Arizona 5 189 786 842 15 44.3% 
Arkansas 2 772 131 986 8 39.8% 
California 32 199 800 883 10 28.9% 
Colorado 2 105 049 443 44 24.7% 
Connecticut 3 040 683 868 12 25.1% 
Delaware 0 0 - 0.0% 
Florida 20 788 525 1 149 5 55.9% 
Georgia 5 802 913 620 33 34.1% 
Hawaii 2 355 316 1 832 1 47.9% 
Idaho 1 078 543 735 27 34.3% 
Illinois 7 760 590 605 35 27.6% 
Indiana 5 334 275 845 14 39.1% 
Iowa 1 800 829 604 36 29.4% 
Kansas 2 127 597 770 23 33.9% 
Kentucky 2 748 643 653 31 27.6% 
Louisiana 3 427 486 799 18 35.5% 
Maine 1 041 216 788 20 29.0% 
Maryland 3 381 694 602 37 23.2% 
Massachusetts 4 009 371 623 32 20.7% 
Michigan 8 080 905 800 16 34.1% 
Minnesota 4 437 407 859 13 25.6% 
Mississippi 3 047 837 1 047 17 50.9% 
Missouri 3 100 045 531 40 30.5% 
Montana 0 0 - 0.0% 
Nebraska 1 409 015 797 19 35.6% 
Nevada 3 163 832 1 268 3 51.4% 
New Jersey 0 0 - 0.0% 
New Hampshire 6 853 418 786 21 27.6% 
New Mexico 1 741 673 891 9 34.1% 
New York 11 263 576 583 38 20.6% 
N. Caroline 5 021 648 567 39 24.4% 
N. Dakota 427 487 672 30 26.4% 
Ohio 7 733 133 674 29 31.4% 
Oklahoma 1 799 947 503 42 23.1% 
Oregon 0 0 - 0.0% 
Penn. 8 403283 675 28 28.9% 
Rhode Island 854 257 800 17 31.2% 
S. Carolina 3 186 306 737 26 41.1% 
S. Dakota 679 162 869 11 57.5% 
Tennessee 6 451 838 1 068 6 60.6% 
Texas 18 275 210 777 25 49.9% 
Utah 1 890 793 741 25 34.6% 
Vermont 326 055 523 41 13.5% 
Virginia 3 263 647 427 45 19.0% 
Washington 10 048 349 1 571 2 61.2% 
West Virginia 1 125 766 619 34 24.7% 
Wisconsin 4 127 972 743 24 29.9% 
Wyoming 624 924 1 213 4 29.4% 
All States 226 523 438 7 - 32.1% 
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Table 12:  Possible Forms of Sales Tax at the State Level 
 Possible Forms of Sales Tax at the State Level 
 
 
  1) National Sales Tax with a Revenue-Sharing Mechanism 
 
 
  2) Origin-based Taxes 
  
• VAT with uniform rates 
• VAT with variable rates 
 
 
  3) Destination-based Taxes 
 
• Retail Sales Tax 
• VAT with uniform rates 
• VAT with variable rates  
 
 
  4) A joint federal-state VAT (dual VAT)  
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Table 13: VAT Rates applied in the Member States, January 2014 
 
 
 3
I. LIST OF VAT RATES APPLIED IN THE MEMBER STATES 
Member States Code 
Super 
Reduced 
Rate 
Reduced Rate Standard Rate Parking Rate
Belgium BE - 6 / 12 21 12 
Bulgaria BG - 9 20 - 
Czech Republic CZ - 15 21 - 
Denmark DK - - 25 - 
Germany DE - 7 19 - 
Estonia EE - 9 20 - 
Greece EL - 6,5 / 13 23 - 
Spain ES 4 10 21 - 
France FR 2,1 5,5 / 10 20 - 
Croatia HR - 5 / 13 25 - 
Ireland IE 4,8 9 / 13,5 23 13,5 
Italy IT 4 10 22 - 
Cyprus CY - 5 / 9 19 - 
Latvia LV - 12 21 - 
Lithuania LT - 5 / 9 21 - 
Luxembourg LU 3 6 / 12 15 12 
Hungary HU - 5 / 18 27 - 
Malta MT - 5 / 7 18 - 
Netherlands NL - 6 21 - 
Austria AT - 10 20 12 
Poland PL  5 / 8 23 - 
Portugal PT - 6 / 13 23 13 
Romania RO  5 / 9 24 - 
Slovenia SI - 9,5 22 - 
Slovakia SK - 10 20 - 
Finland FI - 10 / 14 24 - 
Sweden SE - 6 / 12 25 - 
United Kingdom UK - 5 20 - 
 
N.B.:Exemptions with a refund of tax paid at preceding stages (zero rates) are not included above (see section V) 
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Table	14:		VAT	Rates	in	the	EU	and	in	some	countries,	2014	
Country( Single(Rate( Two(Rates( Multiple(Rates(
Single(Rate( ! ! !Denmark! 25! ! !
Two(Rates( ! ! !Austria! ! 20!!!!!!!!!!10!! !Bulgaria! ! 20!!!!!!!!!!9! !Czech!Republic! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!15! !Estonia! ! 20!!!!!!!!!!9! !Germany! ! 19!!!!!!!!!!7! !Latvia! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!12! !Netherlands! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!6! !Slovenia! ! 22!!!!!!!!!9.5! !United!Kingdom! ! 20!!!!!!!!!5! !
Multiple(Rates( ! ! !Belgium! ! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6/12!Cyprus! ! ! 19!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5/9!Finland! ! ! 24!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10/14!France! ! ! 20!!!!!!!!!2.1/5.5/10!Greece! ! ! 23!!!!!!!!!!!!6.5/13!Hungary! ! ! 27!!!!!!!!!!!!!5/18!!!!!!!!!!Ireland! ! ! 23!!!!!!!!!!!4.8/9/13.5!Italy! ! ! 22!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4/10!Lithuania! ! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5/9!Luxembourg! ! ! 15!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3/6/12!Malta! ! !!!!!!!!!! 18!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5/7!!Poland! ! ! 23!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5/8!Portugal! ! ! 23!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6/13!Romania! ! ! 24!!!!!!!!!!5/9!Slovakia! ! ! 20!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!!!!!!Spain!! ! ! 21!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4/10!Sweden! ! ! 25!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6/12!
Other(OECD(Countries( ! ! !Canada! 5%!+!provincial!rates! ! !Japan! 5! ! !Iceland! ! 25.5!!!!!!7! !Norway! ! 25!!!!!!!!!8/14! !New!Zealand! 12.5! ! !Australia! 10! ! !
 
Fonte: EC (2014) and OECD (2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Box 1.  
 
VAT registered firm → → →
(without distinguishing whether domestic
or EU)
tEU  unified 
↓
↓
↓
final consumer             (no VAT number)
tn  state 
Identified only with VAT # 
Pre-retail VAT + RST
Tax burden is given only by tn i.e., rate(s) applied on sales to final 
consumer
tEU < tn
Other VAT regis. firms
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Tavola	15	
 
 
Table 6
Possible solutions to taxing consumption in the EU 
taxes principle state autonomy rate on clearing VAT chain
applied on rates choice intra-Comm. mechanism
supply
RST destination yes no no no
 
preretail VAT + RST destination yes uniform Euro yes yes
rate
Dual VAT destination yes, but lower different yes yes
 
CVAT destination yes, but lower different yes yes
 
Federal VAT - no - yes but only with yes
revenue redistrib.
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Table&16
Possible&solutions&for&a&Eu&tax&
political degree&of administrative economic federal
feasibility innovation functioning effects meaning
VAT easy low good,+some+problems positive high
company&tax medium high medium positive high
energy&tax medium medium good good medium
custom&duties medium low good positive high
some&kind&of&surtax low high medium ? medium
FTT low high difficult+ low medium
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